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ABSTRACT 
TREATING THE REVOLUTION: HEALTH CARE AND SOLIDARITY IN EL 
SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA IN THE 1980S 
MAY 2020 
BRITTANY MCWILLIAMS, B.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Kevin A. Young 
 Health care played an important role in the revolutions of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. Both the Sandinistas and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) prioritized popular health throughout the 1980s. Clinics and hospitals served as 
sites of revolution that drew healthcare solidarity activists from the United States. These 
health internationalists worked to build community-level networks that relied upon 
trained medical volunteers. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, women comprised a bulk 
of the community health workers. These women chose to interact with revolution by 
building on radical promises of universal healthcare access. Healthcare solidarity activists 
trained community volunteers and encouraged women to pursue their own needs within 
the revolutionary frameworks. Health internationalists actively undermined United 
States’ policies toward Central America. In the 1980s, the United States implemented 
economic policies and supported military violence that targeted healthcare infrastructure. 
In training community health workers, treating civilians, sharing knowledge through 
international exchange, and sending funds and medical supplies, health activists mitigated 
some of the damage being done. This thesis posits that health care was an important site 
of revolution for Central Americans and internationalists alike. By choosing to mend 
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bodies, medical activists stood in direct opposition to the violence of the decade. They 
also served as fundamental to the revolution because they helped carry out the will of the 
people. The revolutions rested on the hope of improving the lives of every day 
Nicaraguans and Salvadorans. As the violence of the 1980s forced the guerillas of El 
Salvador and the leaders of Nicaragua to focus on war, the people continued to 
implement revolutionary health goals at the community level. This thesis argues that 
understanding how health internationalists, women, and community activists engaged 
revolutionary ideas of medicine is vital to the study of 1980s Central America. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 “I understand health care as a window through which one can discover more concretely 
the multiple layers, old and new, of a society in the revolutionary-controlled zones, 
forming itself through numerous trials and errors.”1 –Francisco Metzi 
Italian doctor Francisco Metzi first travelled to El Salvador in 1983. After 
spending three years in the guerilla-controlled territories of the country, he documented 
his experiences in an attempt “to describe the immense difficulties and the exhilarating 
successes, the bitter disappointments and the real growth processes” of the Salvadoran 
people.2 Metzi, like so many others who travelled Central America in the 1980s, stood in 
solidarity with the people and against the United States, by offering his medical expertise. 
U.S. nurse Susan Classen, too, spent time in El Salvador in the 1980s. Moved by the 
physical and mental trauma of El Salvador’s poor, she helped treat patients and train 
health workers at the community level. Others spent time in Nicaragua, where they 
helped train and disseminate the new health programs of the Sandinista government, and 
where many helped in the war zones of that country as well. Each person who dedicated 
their life to aiding the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran people put themselves at risk; this was 
especially so for those who spent time in war zones and dared to engage in medical 
practice.  
                                                
1 Francisco Metzi, The People’s Remedy: The Struggle for Health Care in El Salvador’s 
War of Liberation, trans. Jean Carroll (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988 Medical 
Aid for El Salvador), 2-3. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
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Despite the international laws regarding medical neutrality in war zones,3 the 
practice of targeting healthcare workers and facilities seems ubiquitous in conflict. This 
fact remains as true in today’s conflicts as it was in the Central American conflicts of the 
late twentieth century.4 Despite the dangers, solidarity workers, alongside the incredible 
volunteers of Central America, worked to provide healthcare services to the civilians 
most deeply impacted. Both countries went through major civil conflict in the 1980s, 
which manifested in violence against civilian populations, displacement within the region 
and abroad, and the explicit targeting of healthcare workers and facilities. Much of this 
violence was supported and funded by the United States, and the legacy of that violence 
continues to impact Central America today.  
This thesis argues that U.S. solidarity health workers addressed U.S. policy in 
Central America by healing the very people the U.S. sought to destroy. As U.S.-backed 
forces intentionally destroyed health systems, solidarity activists built them back up; as 
                                                
3 Medical neutrality, enshrined in international laws through the Geneva Conventions, 
requires the protection of healthcare workers and facilities, the unhindered access to care, 
the humane treatment of all civilians, and non-discrimination in treatment of the injured, 
regardless of affiliation. For more information, see the International Committee of the 
Red Cross’s database on international humanitarian law, particularly rules 25-29, 35, 55, 
and 92. See also the Physicians for Human Rights Introduction to Medical Neutrality, 
https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Introduction-to-Medical-Neutrality-Fact-
Sheet-2013.pdf.  
4 Soumitra S. Bhuyan, Ikenna Ebuenyi, & Jay Bhatt, “Persisting trend in the breach of 
medical neutrality: a wake-up call to the international community,” BMJ Global Health 1 
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2016-000109. See this article’s conversation on 
the attacks against healthcare workers and facilities in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria 
spanning from 2012 to 2016. For more reading on recent breaches of medical neutrality 
in the Middle East, see Zoë Mullan, “Medical neutrality: resetting the moral compass,” 
The Lancet 4, no. 4 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2016-000109 and Adia 
Benton & Sa’ed Atshan, “‘Even War has Rules’: On Medical Neutrality and Legitimate 
Non-Violence,” Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 40, no. 2 (2016), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-016-9491-x.  
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U.S.-backed forces aimed weapons at civilians, activists treated their wounds; as U.S.-
backed forces restricted access to medicine and supplies, activists bought and shipped 
medications to those in need. This work focuses on the activist side of the equation, with 
careful consideration of where those solidarity workers fit into the revolutions in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Health care was an important site of revolution, particularly for 
women and the poorest communities of Central America. During the 1980s, healthcare 
solidarity workers saw this reality and worked in tandem with Central American activists 
to make the revolutions real for those to whom it mattered most.  
Chapter one lays the foundation for this work by discussing background on the 
conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua, considering the existing literature on healthcare 
solidarity and how this thesis expands upon it, and discussing the goals and methodology 
of this work. Chapter two dives into the healthcare systems and statistics leading up to 
and then defining the 1980s. Understanding how each of the acting bodies approached 
healthcare is integral to the arguments that follow. Chapter three engages many voices of 
healthcare solidarity and seeks to understand how they understood and navigated their 
role within a revolutionary system. Chapter four offers a gendered perspective of health 
care in the revolution by arguing that women embraced leadership in developing 
revolutionary health systems. Chapter four further investigates ways in which solidarity 
bolstered women’s voices within communities. Chapter five offers a look at how the 
popular healthcare systems of El Salvador and Nicaragua fared in the early 1990s and in 
the face of neoliberal policies.  
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A. Background on El Salvador and Nicaragua 
1. El Salvador 
“I came to see that the violence in El Salvador didn’t begin with the war. The 
revolution was like an abscess that burst from the pressure of social unrest.”5 –Susan 
Classen 
 The conflict in El Salvador was rooted in the 1920s when Agustín Farabundo 
Martí Rodríguez, along with a growing number of radical left supporters, helped lead a 
peasant insurrection against an oligarchical ruling class.6 In January 1932, campesinos 
rose up in response to “the transformation of a radicalized union movement that became 
revolutionary under the pressure of frustration among peasants and rural workers with the 
violent abrogation of democratic rights, combined with a rapid increase in rates of 
exploitation and dispossession.”7 The massacre that came in retaliation for the uprising 
resulted in decades of continued repression along with “commonsense notions about the 
danger of reformism and foreign communist manipulation of peasants.”8 Martí and his 
Marxist-Leninist beliefs became the basis for the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, FMLN), the guerilla 
group embroiled in violent conflict with the Armed Forces of El Salvador throughout the 
1980s. The conflict ended with the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992. 
                                                
5 Susan Classen, Vultures & Butterflies: Living the Contradictions, 136. 
6  Jeffrey L. Gould and Aldo A. Lauria-Santiago, To Rise in Darkness: Revolution, 
Repression, and Memory in El Salvador, 1920-1932 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008), 88. 
7 Ibid., xxiii.  
8 Ibid., xix.  
 	 5 
The roots of the violence were nothing new in Salvadoran society. In 1982, Americas 
Watch Committee and the American Civil Liberties Union identified those causes as “the 
highly concentrated system of land tenure, the denial of basic rights to a peasant majority 
still prevented by law and practice from forming independent organizations, and a half 
century of hardline military rule by an army that has traditionally represented the interests 
of the landed oligarchy.”9 
 The Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador came to power via coup on 
October 15, 1979. The violence that defined the civil war began in 1972, “in the face of 
60 percent inflation and 30 percent unemployment,” when a “coalition of opposition 
parties formed to run against the oligarchy’s official candidate,” Colonel Arturo Armando 
Molina. 10 Despite the victory of the opposition candidate, José Napoleon Duarte, Molina 
was declared the winner. “Molina’s government was known for its friendliness to the 
interests of foreign investors, export companies, landowners, and anyone who supported 
his repressive rule.”11 These policies exacerbated inequality, which the Salvadoran people 
protested. The regime violently suppressed protests and silenced prominent figures that 
spoke out against the military violence. For example, on February 15, 1977, some 200 
peaceful protesters were killed in San Salvador; on March 24, 1980, the Archbishop of El 
Salvador, Óscar Romero, who had turned against the regime, was assassinated while 
conducting mass; on December 2, 1980, four American church women, three of whom 
                                                
9 Report on Human Rights in El Salvador: Compiled by Americas Watch Committee and 
the American Civil Liberties Union, January 26, 1982, xix.  
10 Teresa A. Meade, A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present (U.K., and 
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), 292. 
11 Ibid., 292. 
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were nuns, all of whom worked with the poor of El Salvador, were raped and murdered 
by Salvadoran paramilitaries.12  
 The brutality displayed in the 1970s endured through the 1980s, a decade that saw 
the regime targeting civilian populations living in war zones and guerilla-controlled 
territories. By the signing of the peace accords, an estimated 75,000 Salvadorans, a 
majority of whom were civilians, were dead, 13 and the US had poured over US$6 billion 
(US$4 billion via the United States Agency for International Development, USAID) into 
the Salvadoran government in attempt to defeat the communist threat.14 In The Massacre 
at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War, Mark Danner documents the United States’ 
complicity with one of the most well-known and horrifying massacres carried out during 
the war. The brutal assault and murder of the people sheltered in the village of El Mozote 
in December 1981 was not only a crime against humanity, but it was also covered up by 
the Reagan administration, which helped train the troops who carried out such horrific 
acts.15 In fact, by 1987, under the Reagan administration, El Salvador had become “the 
only country since South Vietnam in which U.S. aid surpassed the government’s national 
budget. Counterinsurgency training, U.S. military advisers, bombing campaigns, low-
intensity warfare, electoral manipulation, subversion of the labor movement – the entire 
                                                
12 Ibid., 292-293. 
13 Ibid., 295. 
14 Adán Quan, “Through the looking glass: U.S. aid to El Salvador and the politics of 
national identity,” American Ethnologist 32, no. 2 (2005): 280, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3805283. 
15 Mark Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1993). 
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U.S. foreign policy arsenal [had] been used in El Salvador, and the United States [had] 
become a virtual parallel government in the country.”16 
 The low-intensity warfare conducted by the United States in Central America 
during the 1980s was a reincarnation of “the most repressive aspects of the covert 
operations and counterinsurgent doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s,”17 policies that 
encouraged the Salvadoran Army’s strategy of ‘draining the sea’. This policy aimed to 
eliminate the support base, and potential support base, of the FMLN by destroying the 
people and the infrastructure of the war zones. It was, according to John Waghelstein, the 
leader of the U.S. military’s advisory team in El Salvador, “total war at the grassroots 
level.”18 This total war on the ground meant the intentional targeting of health care, 
healthcare workers, facilities, and those found in possession of medical equipment. The 
low-intensity warfare of the United States deeply impacted the people of Central America 
in every way, but the destruction, and attempted destruction, of their health was one 
particular way that Nicaraguan and Salvadoran citizens suffered most during the decade 
of violence.  
2. Nicaragua 
 In many ways Nicaragua was the inverse of El Salvador. While El Salvador’s 
revolutionary movement was being violently suppressed, Nicaragua’s had succeeded; 
while the Salvadoran government implemented mass violence against its civilians, 
Nicaragua’s government sought to build a government for the masses; while the United 
                                                
16 Metzi, The People’s Remedy, xi. 
17 Quoted in Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and 
the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006), 118. 
18 Ibid., 91. 
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States funneled millions of dollars toward the support of the Salvadoran government, the 
United States funneled millions of dollars to destroy the Nicaraguan government. Despite 
the differences, the civilian populations of each endured violence and hardship at the 
hands of United States’ policies. The low-intensity warfare used against Salvadoran 
peasants also defined the violence in Nicaragua. 
 Like the FMLN, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinsta 
National Liberation Front, FSLN) in Nicaragua was rooted in politics of the 1920s. 
Augusto César Sandino led armed opposition to U.S. occupation from 1927 to 1933.19 
Despite the relationship between Sandino and Martí, and though the U.S. labeled him a 
communist, Sandino “was not motivated by communist ideology.”20 Though the U.S. 
occupying force did withdraw from Nicaragua in 1933, it left a U.S.-trained National 
Guard and a president friendly to U.S. interests. On February 21, 1934, Sandino was 
executed, which set the stage for his name to be used again decades later in advocating 
for change in the country.  
 After ordering Sandino’s execution, Anastasio Somoza García assumed the 
presidency, a position he and then then his sons, would hold for several decades. The 
Somoza era saw the repression of the Nicaraguan people and ultimately led to the 
formation of the FSLN in 1961. For nearly two decades, the FSLN battled against the 
Somoza regime in an attempt to install a democratic, revolutionary government. On July 
19, 1979, the FSLN successfully brought down the regime of Anastasio “Tachito” 
                                                
19 Matilde Zimmermann, Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 5. 
20 Meade, A History of Modern Latin America, 208. 
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Somoza DeBayle in a victory that reverberated in Central America and terrified the 
United States.21  
Nicaragua has long been a hotspot for U.S. intervention. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, the U.S. was deeply interested in building a canal across Nicaragua. With few 
exceptions, the United States government occupied Nicaragua for twenty-two years 
between 1911 and 1933 in a move to give U.S. companies greater advantage in the fruit 
and coffee industries.22 In the 1920s, Nicaragua became “the site of a struggle over U.S. 
involvement in international affairs.”23 When the U.S.-friendly Somoza dictatorship fell 
in 1979, the United States again intervened in the country by arming and training 
opposition fighters against the Sandinistas. This group, the Contras, would devastate the 
Nicaraguan countryside and severely limit the FSLN’s ability to enact real reform.  
Not only was the violence of the U.S.-backed Contras detrimental to the FSLN, 
but from 1981, the United States “blocked $163.5 million in multilateral loans to 
Nicaragua, which were intended to fund road and housing construction projects as well as 
new health facilities.”24 By ending bilateral assistance, blocking multilateral loans and 
commercial credit, and enforcing a trade embargo against Nicaragua, the Reagan 
administration forced the FSLN to turn toward the USSR for assistance, and effectively 
curbed their support for the FMLN in El Salvador.25 
                                                
21 Zimmermann, Sandinsta, 220. 
22 Meade, A History of Modern Latin America, 208. 
23 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin 
America (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 265. 
24 Paula Braveman, “Nicaragua: A Health System Developing Under Conditions of 
War”, International Journal of Health Services 17, no. 1 (1987): 175, doi: 
10.2190/DB43-MWPL-2V12-WGXY. 
25 William M. Leogrande, “Making the economy scream: US economic sanctions against 
Sandinista Nicaragua,” Third World Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1996): 329-348.  
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The U.S. actions against Nicaragua in the 1980s diverted money, time, and 
attention away from developing the healthcare system the FSLN aimed to build. 
Moreover, the resources that were funneled toward health were more frequently allocated 
to victims of the Contra war. The low-intensity warfare that the United States waged 
against Nicaragua, like that in El Salvador, had very real and devastating consequences 
on the ground. The role of U.S. policy in Central America inspired solidarity in many 
citizens. These citizens engaged in solidarity at home and, in many cases, by travelling to 
Central America. 
B. Scholarship 
 This thesis brings together existing scholarship on the conflicts in 1980s El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, health care under the FSLN, FMLN and Salvadoran 
government, and Central American solidarity. To date, a thorough consideration of the 
intersection between solidarity, health care, and U.S. intervention in Central America has 
not been undertaken. Though health often figures as a minor topic in the work on the 
Central American solidarity movement, it warrants greater focus. Not only was health 
care a major target in the violence that besieged Central America, but also many 
Americans and others from around the world travelled specifically to offer their support 
by providing medical care and community health planning. The actions of healthcare 
solidarity workers, those based in the U.S. and those who went to Central America, 
helped build on the popular health movements supported by revolutionaries. This thesis 
brings together previous scholarship along with new analysis in order to further 
illuminate the place of healthcare solidarity in building the revolutions of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.  
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 Memoirs comprise a large portion of the written work on Central American 
solidarity, and those written by healthcare workers and activists give important detailed 
accounts of the realities healthcare solidarity workers faced. In 1984, Charles Clements, 
published Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador. In this memoir, Clements 
weaves together his time as a pilot for the U.S. Air Force with his later endeavor to aid 
the suffering population in El Salvador’s war zone. Clement’s memoir is both an 
indictment of U.S. imperialism and a narrative tale of the realities of a foreign doctor on 
the ground in El Salvador.26 Francisco Metzi’s The People’s Remedy: The Struggle for 
Health Care in El Salvador’s War for Liberation (1988) looks at the experiences of 
someone who learned the centrality of health care to revolution upon arrival. He came to 
understand the revolutionary struggle through the building of successful health 
programs.27 In Vultures and Butterflies: Living the Contradictions (1992), Susan Classen 
expands on her time working as a nurse in El Salvador. She notes, in the first line, that 
the “book was born of contradictions,”28 and in part, she refers to hope in the midst of 
destruction, peace and love in the midst of malice and violence, and acts of healing in the 
midst of so much death. These memoirs illuminate the contradictions and give insight to 
the lived reality for solidarity workers in Central America. They are vital sources of 
narrative that give life to the analysis presented here.  
 A portion of scholarly works focus on US-based solidarity efforts. In Sanctuary: 
The New Underground Railroad (1986), Renny Golden and Michael McConnell write 
                                                
26 Charles Clements, Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1984). 
27 Metzi, The People’s Remedy. 
28 Susan Classen, Vultures and Butterflies: Living the Contradictions (Eugene, Oregon: 
Wipf & Stock Pub, 2005), 9. 
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about the church’s role in keeping refugees safe on American soil.29 Roger Peace’s A 
Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign (2012) looks at the battle to end 
U.S. funding of the violence in Nicaragua.30 Emily K. Hobson considers solidarity of the 
radical gay and lesbian left based in San Francisco in her 2016 book Lavender and Red: 
Liberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian Left.31 The US-based response remains 
significant to this work, though not central. Domestic actors often used health care as part 
of their rhetoric against U.S. policies but less frequently made health care a central 
concern. For these actors, healing wounds directly was hardly as possible as pressuring 
Reagan’s administration.  
Recent scholarship that emphasizes the agency of Latin American’s in fostering 
and building solidarity serves as a significant base in this paper. Héctor Perla, Jr., argues 
for a transnational approach to the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement 
(CAPSM). “Nicaraguan and Salvadoran revolutionaries, both in Central America and in 
the United States, played crucial roles in this movement’s creation, growth, and 
success.”32 Perla criticizes earlier scholarship for identifying U.S. activists as “sole 
protagonists” of solidarity.33 This thesis follows Perla’s transnational lens by arguing that 
U.S. healthcare solidarity workers played a crucial role in supporting popular health, but 
                                                
29 Renny Golden, and Michael McConnell, Sanctuary: The New Underground Railroad 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986). 
30 Roger Peace, A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign (Amherst: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). 
31 Emily K. Hobson, Lavender and RedLiberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian 
Left (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016). 
32 Héctor Perla, Jr., “Si Nicaragua Venció, El Salvador Vencerá: Central American 
Agency in the Creation of the U.S.-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement”, 
Latin American Research Review 43, no. 2 (2008), 137, doi: 10.1353/lar.0.0011. 
33 Ibid., 138. 
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that they were only successful in that role when putting the needs and desires of the 
community first. Many healthcare activists sought a lower position in the hierarchy of 
decision-making, though most recognized that they continued to receive privileges 
associated with their race and nationality.  
Comrades in Health: U.S. Internationalists, Abroad and at Home, the work of 
Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Theodore M. Brown on healthcare internationalism acts as a 
basis for understanding the significance of healthcare within the broader context of 
solidarity. Solidarity encompasses a wide range of actions taken in support of people all 
over the world. This work considers that subsection of healthcare internationalists, 
whether they be trained health professionals, public health workers, or citizens 
contributing their time or money to advocating for healthcare access. Birn and Brown 
argue that “U.S. health activist efforts may be understood as a form of resistance.”34 It 
may also be understood as revolutionary. The actions of health internationalists in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua aligned with and built upon the revolutionary goals of the 
people.  
This thesis argues that supporting the popular health systems of Central America 
served not only as a revolutionary act, but also as resistance to U.S. policies and the U.S.-
backed actions of the Contra and the Salvadoran government. Understanding the role of 
healthcare solidarity activists is important because, according to Birn and Brown, “the 
story of American health internationalists remains little known.”35 This thesis works to 
                                                
34	Anne-Emmanuelle Birn and Theodore M. Brown, “Introduction,” in Comrades in 
Health: U.S. Health Internationalists, Abroad and at Home, ed. Anne-Emmanuelle Birn 
and Theodore M. Brown (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 6.	
35 Ibid., 6. 
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rectify that obscurity by engaging the stories and experiences of health solidarity workers 
in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s. 
Scholarship on gender and revolution plays an important role in chapter four 
where it is discussed more thoroughly. This thesis draws especially on the scholarship of 
Diana Carolina Sierra Becerra36 and Sandy Smith-Nonini37. Sierra Becerra and Smith-
Nonini each contend that Central American women defined revolution that was feminist 
and broke with traditional gender roles. Smith-Nonini notes that healthcare, in particular, 
served as a vital stage upon which women developed their own gendered ideas of 
revolution.  
Steve Striffler’s 2019 work, Solidarity: Latin America and the US Left in the Era 
of Human Rights, offers an extensive and important consideration of American’s 
solidarity with Latin America starting with the anti-imperialism of the nineteenth century. 
Striffler explores “the broader history of Latin American solidarity in order to better 
understand how current forms of solidarity came to be, and how past efforts have or have 
not shaped or diverged from more recent struggles.”38 He focuses on the evolution of 
solidarity rather than the mechanics. Striffler’s synthesis serves as a base for this work 
not only for its timeline, but also because it contains important definitions and 
considerations of what solidarity means. As Striffler notes that even his work is not 
                                                
36 Diana Carolina Sierra Becerra, “For Our Total Emancipation: The Making of 
Revolutionary Feminism in Insurgent El Salvador, 1977-1987,” in Making the 
Revolution: Histories of the Latin American Left, ed. Kevin Young (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
37 Sandy Smith-Nonini, Healing the Body Politic: El Salvador’s Popular Struggle for 
Health Rights from Civil War to Neoliberal Peace (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2010). 
38 Steve Striffler, Solidarity, 4. 
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comprehensive, neither is the consideration given here. This thesis gives neither a full 
picture of Central American solidarity, nor a complete analysis of healthcare solidarity in 
the 1980s. Instead, by building upon previous scholarship and making connections with 
the lived experiences of solidarity activists, this work ventures into a new aspect of 
Central American solidarity.  
C. Thesis & Methodology 
 Throughout the 1980s, Central America claimed much of the U.S. government’s 
attention. The supposed threat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua led to the U.S. backing of 
Contra forces stationed on Nicaragua’s borders with Honduras and Costa Rica,39 and to 
years of violence carried out by those forces. In El Salvador, the United States backed 
violent regimes that favored U.S. policies and slaughtered the population in the name of 
eliminating communism. The healthcare systems of these two nations experienced wholly 
different fates in the 1980s. In Nicaragua, the FSLN pursued equitable, popular 
healthcare as a central policy. In El Salvador, the U.S.-backed regime targeted and 
destroyed significant portions of the healthcare system, while the FMLN struggled to 
rebuild community health networks. This thesis considers how healthcare solidarity 
activists responded to the violence and the attempts by Central Americans to build 
popular health networks. U.S. activists played an important role both in supporting these 
networks by travelling to Central America to provide medical care and in sending 
monetary aid and medical supplies. In many cases, activists risked their lives to act as a 
barrier between the people of Central America and the U.S.-backed armed forces. 
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Understanding the many roles played by these solidarity workers is pivotal to the 
conversation on how popular health systems developed in Central America. The policies 
implemented by the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran governments will be considered here at 
length. By considering the motives and actions of solidarity workers and health 
volunteers in El Salvador and Nicaragua, this thesis will spotlight the complexities and 
realities of accessing health care for the majority of Salvadoran and Nicaraguans 
throughout the 1980s. 
This thesis embraces current scholarship that uses transnational thinking as a 
framework for research. It follows the lead of recent works which, as Heidi Tinsman 
argues, “challenge the idea of a stark difference between the North American experience 
(primarily stories about the United States) and that of Latin America (presumably all of 
it).”40  Instead, this paper will consider the particular international connections forged by 
a variety of actors including the U.S. government, U.S. solidarity activists, Central 
American governments and Central American activists. In keeping with Tinsman’s 
argument, the solidarity workers are not here considered to be separate from the world, 
but rather in constant relation with the nations under consideration.  
 Exploring the role of gender in El Salvador’s and Nicaragua’s healthcare systems 
is vital to understanding the consequences of the wars and the attempts to develop 
community health systems in each country. The burden of family health fell primarily on 
mothers in Nicaragua and El Salvador, particularly when so many men were engaged or 
killed in warfare. During the violence and upheaval, women as caretakers contended with 
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a lack of access to medicine and food for their families and for themselves. They were 
asked to shoulder the burdens of provision and care in a time when both tasks were made 
increasingly difficult. Further, women’s access to gynecological care and family planning 
played an important role not only in the developing healthcare system of Nicaragua, but 
also in the rhetoric of U.S. solidarity activists. Women assumed leadership of building 
and maintaining community health networks that benefitted their families and brought 
them together with other women. They stepped into roles that previously had not been 
available to them, and they asserted their own medical needs in a way that pivotally 
shaped access.41  
 At the heart of this thesis lays the claim that health care was revolutionary. For 
women, health care offered a site upon which revolutionary feminism could be built. For 
U.S. solidarity workers, constructing popular health networks through treatment, training, 
and funding epitomized the struggle against oppressive forces and in favor of the people. 
The people of El Salvador and Nicaragua saw in health care a way to engage with the 
promises of revolution. Both the FMLN and FSLN espoused healthcare access as central 
to their cause, but it was the people, the women, and the solidarity workers who actually 
built the revolutionary goal from inside their own communities. Their efforts ensured that 
the basis of the revolution remained central even as fighters and revolutionary leaders 
focused their attention on warfare.  
 In carrying out this research, I engage a variety of sources. U.S. newspapers 
provide an indication of what information was being widely circulated about the conflicts 
in El Salvador and Nicaragua and the U.S. role in perpetuating them. Solidarity 
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organization papers (including newspapers, flyers, informational pamphlets, and 
membership request forms) show the incredible efforts undertaken to persuade the U.S. 
public and policymakers that the violence in Central America needed to stop. They 
provide vital information, prove the commitment of U.S.-based activists, and identify the 
main focus held by each group. Central American government propaganda, particularly 
that put out by the FSLN, identifies the goals and rhetoric used in promoting their cause. 
Medical journals and reports published in Central America and the United States provide 
important statistics and insights into the realities on the ground. Rarely do the reports or 
journals refrain from a moral valuation of the numbers presented, so these sources also 
offer insight into what medical institutions and professionals believed about the actions 
taken by the United States, the governments of Nicaragua and El Salvador, and the 
FMLN. Oral histories conducted by other scholars with Central American activists help 
ensure that this paper considers the incredible work done by Central Americans, for 
Central Americans. I am fortunate to have access to interviews done by the Global 
Feminisms Project with activists involved in health care in Nicaragua during the 1980s. 
Finally, I conducted a series of oral interviews with individuals who were active in 
solidarity during the 1980s. These histories paint a picture of what life was like on the 
ground in El Salvador and Nicaragua. They also identify the motivations of at least some 
solidarity workers and show how so many U.S. citizens chose to act in direct opposition 
to their government.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 SALVADORAN AND NICARAGUAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS   
“access to technically advanced medical care and political economy-inspired struggle 
against oppression and exploitation are two parts of the same agenda.”42 – Anne-
Emanuelle Birn and Theodore M. Brown 
Instability defined the politics of 1980s El Salvador and Nicaragua. Healthcare 
systems, integrally linked to government policy and economic prosperity, underwent 
changes and challenges that impacted the peoples of Central America in drastically 
different ways. In Nicaragua, Sandinista policies attempted to provide universal health 
care through popular health networks that functioned at community and national levels. 
At the same time, Contra forces limited the capacity of the new health policies by 
targeting medical personnel and health centers.43 El Salvador’s military carried out brutal 
campaigns against rural populations, labeled healthcare workers as subversives, and 
hampered the FMLN’s ability to setup health networks in guerilla controlled regions.44   
  El Salvador and Nicaragua traversed different paths in the 1980s, but each was 
deeply impacted by nefarious U.S. policy that hampered the development of effective 
healthcare systems. The Sandinistas were more successful in building health networks, 
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43 Richard Garfield and Glen Williams, Health Care in Nicaragua: Primary Care Under 
Changing Regimes (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 67-68. 
44 Committee for Professional Health Workers (COPROSAL), El Salvador, War and 
Health: The Consequence of the War on the Health of the Salvadoran People 
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whereas the FMLN had fewer resources and spent more time focused on fighting El 
Salvador’s armed forces. Health statistics reflect this variation. This chapter navigates the 
history of health care in each of these countries and offers a point of comparison for two 
countries with revolutions that advocated for popular health systems in the face of U.S.-
backed violence.  
A. Nicaragua: Sandinista Healthcare Reforms 
“It will provide health care free of charge to the entire population. It will set up clinics 
and hospitals throughout the country.”45 –Carlos Fonseca 
 Alongside defense of the revolution, economic reforms, and education reforms, 
healthcare reforms formed a crucial cornerstone of FSLN policy.46  The Sandinistas took 
major steps toward the development of universal access to healthcare by promoting a 
system based at the community-level. In building these community networks, the 
government was able to address a number of public health issues including high infant 
mortality rates, widespread lack of access to vaccinations, and high instance of 
communicable disease, all of which flourished under Somoza.47 The Sandinistas 
considered health care such a vital aspect of their policy that “within three weeks [of 
coming to power], they inaugurated the Unified National Health System.”48 
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1. Somoza-Era Health Care 
The rapid implementation of new health policies came in response to decades of 
oppression compounded by years of destruction leading up to the success of the 
revolution. Before the FSLN took power, years of fighting between the National Guard 
and the Sandinista forces resulted in the loss of over 40,000 lives and 100,000 injuries 
and caused major destruction of hospitals, sewage plants, and other public health 
facilities.49 All this destruction was wrought on an already broken system. In the 1970s, 
“Nicaragua possessed some of the Western Hemisphere’s most appalling health 
statistics.”50 As such, a focus on health care was imperative for the Sandinistas in 
building a better Nicaragua and in maintaining popular support. Moreover, the FSLN’s 
policies around healthcare responded to the corruption of the Somoza regime. By 1975, 
for example, thousands of poor Nicaraguans living in Managua made money selling their 
blood to a Somoza-partnered lab that produced 15% of the world’s blood plasma.51 Under 
Somoza, Nicaraguan’s health was something to be profited from; where profit could not 
be made, health was disregarded.  
The Sandinistas sought to rectify the class and geographic divides that defined 
Somoza-era health care. Under Somoza, medical systems suffered everywhere, but the 
people living in poor, rural areas of the country had little, if any, access to treatment. As 
of 1974, three quarters of the health budget was spent in Managua, where only one 
quarter of the population lived.52 Life expectancy during the 1970s was estimated as 
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twenty years less for Nicaraguans than for their Cuban counterparts;53 maternal mortality 
was twice as high in rural areas as in urban centers; urban areas had better, though not 
great, access to potable water and sewage; vaccinations were rare with only 5.7% of the 
vulnerable population under four years of age receiving the diphtheria, pertussis and 
tetanus (DPT) vaccine in 1974.54 The actual statistics are likely worse considering many 
of these estimates were made with incomplete data from rural areas.  
 John M. Donahue, writing in the mid-1980s, argued that Nicaragua’s Ministry of 
Health failed to address these issues prior to 1979 because the health care “system was 
characterized by vertical control, fragmentation with the twenty-three autonomous 
institutions making up the health sector, and a mode of community organization which 
enhanced the control and fragmentation.”55 Moreover, according to Donahue, this was 
less a failure to reform than it was an intentional method used by the Somoza regime to 
maintain control and political patronage over the population.56 He notes that the 
“presence of many competing health institutions diffused internal solidarity within the 
health sector and left each entity dependent on political patronage and control from 
above… Somoza allocated health benefits less on the criteria of need and more on the 
basis of strategic and political impact.”57 This system permeated the entirety of the health 
care system. Hospitals utilized a system which denied care to those who lacked the 
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appropriate admission fee, gave limited care to those with some money, and personalized 
top-tier care to those who showed up with the most funds.58 
 When the FSLN took power in 1979, it intended to deconstruct the network of 
political patronage and privilege put into place by the Somoza regime. The Sandinistas 
put an end to health care as a privilege, and instead created an equitable system of health 
care throughout the country. The reforms revolutionized the medical system of the 
country, though they were not entirely successful.  
2. Outcomes of Reform 
 The Sandinistas faced a monumental task in implementing popular health care in 
a country where there was a limited prior network of facilities, professionals and 
materials upon which to rely. The destruction of existing hospitals and schools in addition 
to the flight of many trained medical professionals during the Revolution left the country 
even more vulnerable than it had been prior to 1979.  Richard Garfield, in discussing his 
experience working in health care in Nicaragua, states that “the Sandinistas were haunted 
by the fear of a mass exodus of doctors” based on the experiences of other Latin 
American nations, like Cuba, where political upheaval had resulted in the flight of many 
health care professionals.59 Some flight was inevitable as “many doctors were part of the 
political and social elite of the country” and supported the Somoza regime.60 The 
substantial impact of the reforms thus merits discussion. Despite setbacks during the 
1980s, the FSLN made incredible strides in improving the Nicaraguan people’s access to 
                                                
58 R. Giuseppi Slater, “Reflections on Curative Health Care in Nicaragua,” American 
Journal of Public Health 79, no. 5 (1989): 646. 
59 Garfield and Williams, Health Care in Nicaragua, 148. 
60 Ibid., 10. 
 	 24 
health care. Moreover, that these steps were made in a developing country immediately 
following years of poor economic and social leadership and a subsequent revolution 
speaks volumes to the commitment of the Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan people, and their 
allies to achieving universal health care. 
 Most accounts argue that the outcomes of Sandinista healthcare reform were 
mixed, but impressive. This interpretation comes, in part, from doctors and other health 
care workers who spent time working in solidarity in newly built clinics and who helped 
develop health programs in Nicaragua. Dr. R. Giuseppi Slater wrote in 1989 of their 
experience working in rural and urban areas of the country, and concluded that 
“Nicaragua, in the nine years since the Sandinista revolution, has developed a medical 
system that is physically and financially accessible, offers care that is very uneven in 
quality, is generally adequate for most common problems, and is suboptimally [sic] 
coordinated with preventive health efforts.”61 Slater’s main criticism of the system 
developed in the 1980s was the failure to offer consistent, high quality care throughout 
the country.  
 U.S. health worker, Sister Patricia Edmiston, discussed the difficulties faced by 
the regime in building a healthcare network from nothing. In one interview she alluded to 
a period of growing pains when she said that, “since the victory, all medicine has been 
free. But that is being changed now because the richer people were taking advantage of 
the [new] system.” She also noted that in the neighborhood where she worked, each 
consultation cost ten cents, though the Ministerio de Salud de la República de Nicaragua 
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(Nicaraguan Ministry of Health, MINSA) held no such standard.62 As the main goal for 
the FSLN was access regardless of financial means, this issue was likely isolated to the 
area where Sister Edmiston worked. Even so, it indicates the uneven distribution of care 
and accessibility, particularly for the extremely poor.  
 The success of the reform lay in its popular roots. MINSA promoted grassroots 
organizing and, starting in 1980, began organizing Jornadas Populares de Salud (Popular 
Health Work Days, JPS, Appendix A), to  “focus the attention of governmental bodies 
and popular organizations on a common activity.”63 These events were intended to 
encourage communication between local health councils and MINSA, though Donahue 
argues that these health days highlighted “two competing philosophies of primary health 
care delivery” within the Ministry, one that was based in popular health, and another 
predicated on institutional primary care.64 The popular health model offered a flexible 
path in which Nicaraguan’s in rural and poor communities had more consistent access to 
health workers, though not necessarily professional medical workers or specialists.65   
Statistics indicate a system that, though it faced challenges, had a broadly positive 
impact on the Nicaraguan people (see Table 1). In just five years’ time, between 1978 
and 1983, government expenditure on health care expanded from 200 million cordobas to 
1,593 million cordobas.66 Massive campaigns around vaccinations saw the near 
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elimination of polio and a rapid reduction in measles.67 Moreover, accessibility to 
medical care increased significantly, with the number of visits to hospitals and health 
clinics doubling in the decade after 1977.68 Visits to community-based primary care 
facilities increased at greater rates than outpatient visits to hospitals, though this fact may 
be contributed in part to the near tripling in number of community-based primary care 
centers.69 This access was increased mostly in areas of greatest need. The number of 
physicians and beds available increased in the first years after the revolution.70 Infant 
mortality “decreased from 121 to 80.2 per 1,000 live births” between 1978 and 1983. In 
the same time period, life expectancy rose from 52 to 59 years, while malaria decreased 
by fifty percent. Diarrhea fell from the first to fourth cause of hospital mortality.71 A new 
emphasis was placed on eliminating childhood dehydration through visits to oral 
rehydration stations. The number of visits to such stations steadily increased throughout 
the 1980s, particularly for children under the age of five.72 
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Table 1: Nicaraguan Health Statistics from 1977 to 1984. 
 
  
That the FSLN achieved so much success while faced with very little 
infrastructure, a legacy of corrupt politics, and continued violence and destruction at the 
hands of the Contras speaks volumes to the dedication and to the positive impacts of state 
planning. Anderson argues that although the “Sandinistas did not accomplish what they 
envisioned in 1979… what they did was impressive, in light of the challenges they 
faced.”73 In just a decade, the Sandinistas tackled many of the pressing health issues 
facing the nation’s poor. Despite the difficulties and setbacks, the FSLN proved that 
social spending worked – a fact that they mobilized against their enemies. This was a 
monumental task set before the Sandinista government, as were the many other reforms 
they undertook, but they nonetheless managed to build a lasting infrastructure of 
hospitals and health care staff as well as eliminate many preventable diseases that 
plagued Nicaragua in the years leading up to 1979.  
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Year Number of 
Vaccine Doses 
Provided1 
Reported 
Cases of 
Measles1 
Reported 
Cases of 
Whooping 
Cough1 
Number of 
Hospital 
Beds1 
Hospital, 
Health Center, 
and Health 
Post Visits1 
Dental 
Visits1 
1977 No Data No Data No Data 4,313 No Data 203,540 
1980 1,790,343 3,784 2,469 4,677 4,982,623 258,742 
1981 2,544,396 224 1,935 4,729 5,411,432 331,821 
1982 3,859,174 220 383 4,765 6,034,445 417,078 
1983 3,304,155 102 90 No Data 6,467,187 448,417 
1984 No Data 153 60 5,040 No Data No Data 
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3. Health Care and the Contras 
The Contra war undermined the dramatic successes achieved by the Sandinistas in 
the early 1980s.74 The U.S.-backed Contras attacked Nicaraguans to undermine the 
Sandinista government. Violence, in all its forms, falls under the umbrella of public 
health issues, and so it was every time the Contras attacked. Not only did they leave a 
wake of death and injury where they went, but they also destroyed important public 
health facilities. The destruction wrought against Nicaraguan infrastructure, including 
healthcare buildings and professionals, was part of a targeted effort to undermine the 
Sandinistas domestic policies.  
FSLN officials diverted financial resources away from social spending and toward 
military investment. Before the Contra war, investment “in health as a percentage of the 
national budget increased by more than 50 percent between 1977 and 1981.”75 Between 
1982 and 1984, the Nicaraguan military budget grew from 18% of total spending to 25%, 
diverting money away from social spending, including the health budget.76 Moreover, the 
budget that remained designated for healthcare services was funneled toward care of 
wounded combatants including the creation of hospitals in war zones specifically for the 
purpose of combatant care.77 Destruction by Contra forces resulted in an estimated $30 
million in health system damages by 1987.78 
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The diversion of resources resulted in regressions of the rapid gains made during 
the Sandinista’s first years. In 1989, writing for the American Journal of Public Health, 
Giussepi Slater stated that “the impact of the contra war, including the resultant economic 
disruption… slowed or reversed some earlier gains.”79 Slater pointed to, for example, the 
initial rapid increase in the number of physicians, nurses and nurse auxiliaries, which 
leveled off later in the decade. In 1977, there were 52 physicians per 100,000 people; in 
1983, that number had increased to 69. By 1987, though, the number had come back 
down to 59 per 100,000.80 Similar trends occurred with nurses and nurse auxiliaries, a 
fact that Slater argued was due to Contra terror efforts. Regression also occurred in 
nation-wide vaccination campaigns. By 1986, regions designated as war zones saw three 
times as many cases of measles, though all regions of the country reported similar 
numbers prior to 1985.81  
Healthcare professionals moved from civilian clinics to serve in hospitals created 
specifically for combatants. Slater noted that, “the lack of clinical teachers and attending 
physicians, already acute because of the exodus of well-trained doctors after the 
revolution, [was] worsened by the contra war, which… caused diversion of resources and 
manpower, including medical manpower.”82 U.S. doctor and solidarity activist, Paula 
Braveman, referred to newly designated combatant facilities as “special hospitals” and 
argued that the movement strained an already groaning system by mobilizing  over five 
thousand healthcare workers and their families and leaving limited staff behind “to cope 
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with the increased patient loads.”83 The reorganization extended beyond health workers 
and permeated the entire network of regional and centralized healthcare that defined 
initial Sandinista policy. The reassignment of regional facilities as emergency and trauma 
centers forced central hospitals in major cities including Managua to take on cases from 
areas outside of their jurisdiction. Moreover, the repositioning burdened urban health care 
and limited access for non-emergency patients.84  
Contra forces specifically targeted healthcare workers and facilities in war zones. 
In reporting on her 1985 and 1986 visits to Nicaragua as part of the Third and Fourth 
North America-Nicaragua Colloquia on Health, Paula Braveman stated: 
As of October 1, 1985, 38 salaried civilian health workers had been killed by the 
Contras. Eleven additional health workers had been wounded and 28 others had 
been kidnapped. Virtually all of these attacks occurred while the health workers 
were assigned to medical functions. Health facilities have also been the direct 
target of contra attacks. Sixty-one health institutions have been completely or 
partially destroyed since 1981, while 37 others have been intermittently or totally 
closed because of contra activity. Fifty-five of the 61 destroyed facilities have 
been health posts, primarily in rural locations.85 
 
Contras aimed to instill fear in the civilian population through this destruction and 
violence leading to a virtually complete shutdown in parts of Nicaragua. One case study 
of the villages surrounding Acoyapa (in central Nicaragua) showed half of the healthcare 
workers had been kidnapped and five had resigned under threat of harm.86 Moreover, the 
same study noted that 20% of health centers in war zones had been attacked, closed, or 
destroyed between 1983 and 1987.87 
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 Simply getting to a health clinic became dangerous when Contra forces began 
mining roads. Land mines threatened travelers and aimed to keep civilian populations 
isolated and afraid. Healthcare workers risked their lives transporting supplies and 
patients between villages, and civilians were often unable to make the treks necessary to 
receive vital care. Marta, a woman from the isolated war zone area of La Pavona, 
suffered from a severe strain of tuberculosis for which she required a monthly shot; the 
trek from her village to the nearest clinic was made impossible by land mines.88 Many 
health workers bravely faced the danger of the roads to deliver emergency care. U.S. 
solidarity activist, Aynn Setright drove an ambulance for two years in conflict zones and 
notes that the job was the most dangerous of all healthcare responsibilities.89 
The war limited access to medicine and medical supplies, particularly in rural 
areas where having such supplies often marked an individual as subversive. Importing 
medicine from abroad, as Nicaragua had limited domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
proved difficult under the financial strain of the war and U.S. economic sanctions.90 The 
mining of the port of Corinto, remembered mainly for the 400,000 gallons of fuel lost,91 
also resulted in the destruction of “660 tons of imported foodstuffs and 40 tons of UN-
donated medical supplies.”92 
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The psychological impacts of the war strained the civilian populations and created 
a need for more mental health workers in the country. In her 1985 and 1986 tours, 
Braveman noted a substantial increase “in the use of outpatient psychiatric services,” 
particularly for those who “lost family members in combat” and “mothers with sons and 
daughters fighting in the war.”93 One study found that in 1987, 18% of mental health 
consultations were related to the war and that soldiers constituted a large number of the 
patients; the same study notes that civilians living within audible distance of gunfire 
suffered higher levels of mental health complications.94 
The Contra war devastated the lives of countless Nicaraguans, and it severely 
strained a burgeoning healthcare system. Violence dampened the successes that had been 
achieved in the early years and undermined progress in conflict zones. Facilities and 
professionals outside of the war zones felt the burden of the conflict as the government 
funneled resources toward the war effort and away from the popular structure 
implemented just days after the Sandinistas took power. During the same period, north of 
Nicaragua another battle raged on; the Salvadoran people and their healthcare system 
suffered, too, under the pressures of war. 
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B. Salvadoran Health Care: A Split System 
“the FMLN… is establishing a health delivery system. The effort is heroic.”95 – 
Medical Aid for El Salvador 
Salvadoran health care suffered dramatically as the country’s civil war raged. The 
(already poor) system deteriorated in the years leading up to the conflict, and the splitting 
of the country into guerilla- and government-controlled areas only furthered the withering 
of the system. Injuries and psychological trauma unique to war-torn areas increased the 
need for access to health care while also ensuring that there was virtually no way to 
acquire medicine, supplies, or professionals. Health care suffered in both regions and was 
particularly difficult to maintain in war zones and guerilla-controlled territories. Despite 
the massive influx of foreign aid given to the Salvadoran government, the statistics for 
the government-controlled areas remained dismal throughout the civil war. Money 
funneled into the country rarely found its way to social expenditures and instead funded 
the brutal violence that characterized the El Salvador of the 1980s. El Salvador’s poorest 
suffered the most from the unequal and difficult access to proper medical care in both the 
guerilla and government controlled territories. Moreover, the healthcare system became a 
pawn in the government’s strategy for winning the war. The government not only 
targeted healthcare facilities and professionals in guerilla-controlled regions, but also 
sought to destroy the very basis of popular health care promoted by the FMLN. This was, 
after all, an attempt to suppress the Salvadoran people, and regardless of where those 
people lived, they needed to be controlled. Nonetheless, the most desperate areas of the 
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country were in the war zones, as evidenced in pamphlets, medical journals, and first-
hand accounts that documented the violence and brutality enacted against those unlucky 
enough to be living in the war zones.  
1. Health Care Prior to the Civil War 
 Much like the situation in Nicaragua leading up to the 1980s, access to health care 
became increasingly restricted for the vast majority of Salvadorans throughout the 1970s. 
El Salvador had long been characterized by economic and social polarization, and the 
“absence of a sound health programme” in addition to “the impossibility of access to 
health services and medicine,” resulted in a “high level of mortality and a condemnation 
of the people to a life of total misery.”96 Throughout the 1970s, health care was a 
particular point of struggle for poor Salvadorans, and lack of access served as a central 
rallying point for the urban poor, rural peasants and student movements.97 Interestingly, 
though, health statistics had a general, upward trend that peaked in the late 1970s and fell 
apart in the wake of the 1979 coups and the subsequent war. 
 The health trends of the decade leading up to war may have been slightly positive, 
but any increases were minimal and insignificant in comparison to the massive financial 
gulf that divided society. Nonetheless, the trends were toward a better health system. 
Between 1960 and 1980, infant mortality fell from 76.3 per 1000 births to 44 per 1000; 
child mortality rates similarly decreased from 17.5 per 1000 to 4.8 per 1000 in 1981, a 
significant improvement; maternal mortality rates fell from 17.4 per 1000 in 1960 to 6.2 
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per 1000 in 1980.98 There was a similarly positive trend in the number of hospitals and 
medical units operated by the Salvadoran Ministry of Health (see Figure 1).99 
Figure 1: Evolution of El Salvador’s Health Infrastructure. 
Behind the statistics lay a reality in which health care was rarely available to most 
Salvadorans. Throughout the 1970s, roughly 15% of the population had reliable access to 
health care (access to private care and the Salvadoran Social Security Institute), leaving 
the remaining 85% with a precarious relationship to medicine (dependent on an 
unreliable and underfunded public health system).100 Moreover, immediately prior to the 
outbreak of the war, the main illnesses reported by Salvadorans were linked to issues of 
sanitation and malnutrition. Between 1969 and 1979, the number of children under five 
years of age who suffered from malnourishment increased by 50%.101 The war, which 
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saw an increased need for medical care alongside a shift of funds away from the Ministry 
of Health and toward military spending, certainly helped to destroy an already crumbling 
system. The system prior to the war was split, and the Ministry of Health had little 
effective control over the allocation of resources and the growing need for medical 
professionals throughout the country.102 
2. Health Care During the Civil War 
The decade of civil war saw a further deterioration of an already hobbled medical 
system. The country was broken up into shifting territories, one of which was controlled 
by the government, the other by the FMLN. Each of these territories saw a piecing 
together of different medical systems under distinctly different interpretations of what 
access to health care should look like. Moreover, the violence saw a greater need in care 
for anyone caught, intentionally or not, in the fighting, and an increased difficulty in 
accessing necessary medical supplies, particularly for Salvadorans in war-torn regions of 
the country. 
The health statistics from civil war-torn El Salvador are staggering. More than 
50% of the population suffered malnutrition; the infant mortality rate in rural areas was as 
high as 18%, with nearly half of all newborns weighing less than five and a half pounds; 
life expectancy was under 45 years.103 One New England Journal of Health article 
remarked that there was “virtually a complete breakdown in the health system. All 
hospitals have shortages… In the Maternity Hospital two or three women occupy the 
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same bed… In the rural areas virtually no medical services exist for the population.”104  
The lack of doctors in the country, one for 25,000 people, meant most Salvadorans had 
no access to healthcare at all.105  
3. Government-Controlled Areas 
 Following the coups of 1979, repression of Salvadoran health care became 
pronounced. In early 1980, Dr. Hector Silva, who performed routine cervical cancer 
testing, was told that his recognition of positive cases was causing a social problem, and, 
when he refused to cease the screenings, he was targeted and forced to flee.106 Dr. Silva’s 
story was but the beginning of years of repression by the government that manipulated 
the healthcare sector in order to undermine the Salvadoran people. The government saw 
healthcare programs and efforts as subversive to their agenda as well as threatening to the 
elites who had held onto power in the country for decades. 
 What government funds had been channeled toward health care were, once the 
conflict began, largely subverted toward military efforts. Between 1976 and 1986, the 
Salvadoran Ministry of Health saw a decrease from 10.6% to 7.1% in the share of the 
government budget received (see Figure 2).107 The decrease in budget meant that that 
hospitals and clinics struggled, more than they had previously, to provide even the most 
basic care to patients. In hospitals surrounding San Salvador, doctors and nurses often 
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lacked food for patients.108 One bulletin reported that the death rate of sick newborns 
admitted to San Salvador’s Maternity Hospital approached an astounding 80%.109 
Pharmacies had few medications to give, if any, and, for those medications that were 
available, inflation of prices ensured they were out of reach for many Salvadorans.110  
 
 
Figure 2: Share of El Salvador’s Health Budget Allocation. 
4. FMLN-Controlled Areas 
 The FMLN saw health care as a community issue, and one that should be entirely 
removed from the market. Victor Amaya and Maria Black have summarized the FMLN 
position by noting that the organization argued, “no matter what type of medicine one 
practices, if health, knowledge, skills and resources are sold on the market as 
commodities this will necessarily limit access to health care, fragment and distort the 
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nature of the health process, constrain the relation between health workers and users, and 
undermine people’s control over their health.”111  
While the FMLN touted equal access to medicine for all Salvadorans, the reality 
of care was far less rosy. Resources in war zones and guerilla-controlled areas were 
scarce, and where resources and facilities did exist, they often did not exist for long. 
Francisco Metzi described guerilla hospitals as similar to neighborhood cafés where 
people gathered to discuss the latest news.112 According to Metzi, they were lively places, 
but also places with very few resources. In describing the treatment of one FMLN 
combatant, Juan, who had been shot in the leg, Metzi says: 
It was a period in which we were very short on medical supplies. We didn’t even 
have IV fluid. Under these conditions, an amputation is a delicate operation, and 
even more so in the presence of a ferocious germ [like gangrene, which Juan had 
developed]. But in spite of all this, we operated on Juan under a silk-cotton tree, 
cutting through the bone with the tiny sawblade of a Swiss Army knife, and using 
the milk from several coconuts as IV fluid.113 
  
Metzi’s story highlights one extreme of the medical reality many faced during the war 
years, but while scarcity was a constant, the degree of struggle varied greatly. In the latter 
years of the war in the department of Morazán, FMLN medical care held to a clear 
hierarchy with considerably more access to medicine and equipment than Metzi 
experienced. In Michael Terry’s account of his time working as a brigadista in the 
mountains of Morázan, he describes well-developed capacities for surgeries related to 
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war wounds, and notes that there was access to anesthetic, IV fluids, and other equipment 
necessary for surgeries; he boasts that all of the surgery patients he saw survived.114 
 Michael Terry’s account contains two particularly striking points. First, despite 
the success the FMLN achieved in developing the medical system of Morázan, the health 
clinics changed location daily so as to avoid detection and attack.115 This forced critical 
cases to be relocated further into the mountains, but also meant that healthcare workers 
were mobile and ready to perform surgery on the spot.116 They may have achieved 
greater success in their medical structures, but the guerillas nonetheless were restricted in 
establishing real change for the rural populations. The second striking point in Terry’s 
account is his reference to the inversion in types of care that health professionals felt 
most comfortable and able to treat. Over the decade, the guerillas had developed 
advanced skills in dealing with gunshot wounds, injuries from shrapnel, and other war-
related injuries, but, as Terry notes, the “more serious problems at the clinic were dengue, 
psychiatric disorders, fractures, and sexually transmitted infections.”117 In the war zones, 
expertise followed necessity, and so treating and controlling illnesses that may have been 
more readily treatable elsewhere, became the major struggle for war-zone clinics. 
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 The various accounts on medical care in the guerilla-controlled areas of El 
Salvador indicate a blurred line between civilians and combatants. The FMLN 
encouraged the development of a popular health system within communities. The clinics, 
staffed by community health workers and, at times, international solidarity activists, 
depended on the expertise of FMLN doctors and surgeons. While working in Las Vueltas 
and the surrounding communities, Susan Classen and her Salvadoran colleagues relied on 
FMLN support in handling severe injuries.118 Sandy Smith-Nonini notes the reciprocal 
nature of the relationship, stating that just as FMLN “physicians treated sick or injured 
civilians, promoters based in villages sometimes cared for wounded combatants. Several 
sanitarios and civilian lay workers… assisted physicians in surgeries.”119 This was the 
nature of the popular health system upon which combatants and civilians depended.  
In the accounts of Maria Eugenia, Francisco Metzi, Charles Clements, Michael 
Terry, Susan Classen, and others, the instability and chaos that defined the lives of 
Salvadorans resulted in a rush to help whoever needed help, regardless of their 
relationship to the war or their political persuasion. That civilians had no option but to 
seek care from popular clinics supported by the FMLN made no difference to the 
Salvadoran military officers who pegged the peasants as subversive. Certainly, for many 
medical workers, a peasant’s political persuasion mattered little when they required aid. 
 Although the FMLN ideally saw an El Salvador with medical access for all, the 
reality of the guerilla’s actions during the war often fell short of that, even in territories 
they controlled. Peasants reported preferential treatment at clinics, not only for fighters, 
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but also those related to guerillas.120 Charles Clements alludes to this in the account he 
gives of his time working as a doctor in solidarity with the guerillas. Clements recalls a 
series of conferences held to determine the division of medicine in the areas villages, and 
tells of one medical combatant in particular who spoke at length in favor of unequal 
distribution of resources to fighters because their heroism.121 This favoritism meant that 
some peasants would have been unable to access medical care, as resources were slim. 
One medical report published in 1989 in the New England Journal of Health 
acknowledged medical neutrality was certainly violated at times by the FMLN, but that 
the most frequent and most egregious violations were carried out by the Salvadoran 
government.122 This reality is evidenced by how readily the Salvadoran government 
wielded violence against medical professionals, supplies, buildings, and knowledge. 
5. Targeting Health Care 
 The Salvadoran government deliberately breached international medical neutrality 
in favor of undermining the enemy. 123 The tactic, hardly isolated to the Salvadoran 
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conflict, brought even greater suffering to a population already being massacred and 
displaced by the thousands.  The deliberate attacks on healthcare workers and facilities as 
well as medical knowledge, and the constant attempts to cut off medical supplies, 
particularly to guerilla-controlled territories, took a toll, and contributed to the heightened 
levels of brutality that came to define the civil war. 
The Salvadoran military targeted healthcare workers and facilities in their 
campaign to weed out guerilla forces. The government considered social organization of 
any kind, including that around health, to be subversive.124 That the FMLN healthcare 
workers often blurred between aiding guerillas and aiding peasants hardly helped this 
issue. Many health workers, with their promotion of community organization, were 
“imprisoned or killed by military or paramilitary death squads.”125 Simply having gauze 
resulted in death or imprisonment as possession was reserved for the military.126 The 
threats against health workers prompted many more to flee the country, draining 
communities of their main resources for health care and medical expertise.  
Of the health workers who remained and continued their work in El Salvador, 
many disappeared during the civil war years. In 1983, Dr. Alfred Gellhorn wrote of a 
medical mission he undertook to determine the location of twenty missing health workers 
and scientists. Not only was the delegation unable to determine where thirteen of the 
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missing were, they discovered a list of another twenty who had gone missing in San 
Salvador in 1982. These numbers likely only represent a fraction of the reality as merely 
reporting a missing family member could put entire families in danger of government 
violence.127 
The Salvadoran military wielded destruction of knowledge as a weapon against 
the most vulnerable of the country’s population. They not only targeted health care 
workers in war zones, but attacked the very fabric of the system. On June 27, 1980, the 
Salvadoran Army attacked The University of El Salvador, the national university that 
hosted the country’s only medical school. The army massacred forty students during the 
takeover, and, in the proceeding four years of occupation, shut down the school and 
ransacked its libraries and laboratories. In a September 10, 1984 news article, Chris 
Hedges noted that although the army had allowed the school to be reopened, over half of 
the books in the library had been stolen or destroyed. Moreover, El Salvador’s most 
important medical school lost “all of the medical equipment and some 75 of the medical 
books.”128 The cost of reopening and restocking the country’s premier university, and 
medical school, was tremendous. The cost of losing four years of medical advancement 
and investigation was priceless.  
C. Healthcare Access for Central American Refugees 
The violence that afflicted Nicaragua and El Salvador displaced thousands of 
civilians. Some moved across borders to neighboring countries of Costa Rica and 
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Honduras, others fled further abroad, including to the United States, and many faced 
internal displacement. Both El Salvador and Nicaragua also took in refugees from other 
Central American nations, with the Sandinista government embracing Salvadoran 
refugees. Between 1981 and 1987, some 22,000 Nicaraguan refugees were estimated in 
Costa Rica,129 while at the same time, an estimated 16,000 Salvadoran refugees moved to 
Nicaragua.130 The displaced populations not only had a harder time accessing health care, 
they also tended to need health care more frequently because of the danger inherently 
involved in clandestine movement through the countryside and the poverty that defined a 
displaced person’s existence. Moreover, refugees were often treated poorly, especially as 
their growing numbers overwhelmed the capacities of receiving countries. 
1. Displaced Populations of Nicaragua 
 The upheaval of the 1970s and 1980s forced thousands of Nicaraguans from their 
homes. This process began with the Somoza regime. In early 1979, some 50,000 refugees 
fled to Costa Rica to escape the oppression of the regime prior to its downfall.131 With the 
beginning of the Contra war, many more Nicaraguans fled from their homes. As early as 
1983, significant portions of the population had been impacted. Though the height of the 
Contra war came later, the turmoil of the 1970s and the 1979 Sandinista victory, along 
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with the early rumblings of Contra controversy, saw 22,000 Nicaraguans as refugees in 
Costa Rica and Honduras and another 85,000 internally displaced.132  
By 1990, the number of internally displaced Nicaraguans was estimated at 
250,000, with many more having fled to other countries.133 Not all who left became 
registered refugees in other countries. The bulk of Guatemala’s 220,000 undocumented 
persons consisted of Nicaraguans and Salvadorans,134 and many more undocumented 
Nicaraguans travelled elsewhere in Central America, and even further afield, to countries 
like the United States. Many who fled the warfare became registered refugees. By 1989, 
Costa Rica hosted an estimated 26,500 Nicaraguan refugees;135  El Salvador hosted 500 
Nicaraguan refugees;136 Guatemala hosted 3,300 Nicaraguan refugees;137 and Honduras 
hosted 23,600 Nicaraguan refugees, many of whom were Miskitu or Mayangna (Sumu) 
Indians.138 By the end of 1989, the United States had 21,693 pending asylum cases from 
Nicaraguans.139 
Minority indigenous populations comprised significant portions of the displaced. 
Though the FSLN committed to wiping out “the odious discrimination to which the 
indigenous” were subjected,140 displacement of these populations came from both sides. 
The Contra attacks drove them from their ancestral homes, but the FSLN forcibly 
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displaced some 8,500 Miskito Indians in 1981, resulting in dozens dead.141 The Miskitus, 
a tribe that has long inhabited the eastern coast of Nicaragua and the eastern Honduran-
Nicaraguan border, faced displacement and internal controversy in the war years. As a 
result of the forced relocations, many Nicaraguan Miskitus who fled to Honduras claimed 
“that the Sandinistas were not liberators.”142 In the case of the Mayangna Indians, Contra 
attacks forced the internal resettlement and the breaking of this ethnic group from their 
homeland.143 Though not all of the displaced indigenous were anti-Sandinista, many lived 
in Honduran-based camps that “the Contras tightly controlled.”144 Of those living in the 
Contra-controlled camps, some realized they were trapped, unable to return home, while 
others embraced the Contra cause and the anti-Sandinista propaganda by supporting the 
Kus Indian Sut Asla Nicaragua Ra (United Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Nicaragua, 
KISAN), a Contra-backed, indigenous organization that fought against the Sandinistas. 
When a colleague introduced the creation of KISAN to Roxanne Dunbar-Otis, she saw 
that the “whole setup smelled of CIA design,” and realized that the leaders of the 
organization would be “taking orders from the CIA.”145 The Contras caused displacement 
through violence and in an attempt to create upheaval, but they also seized the 
opportunity to manipulate displaced peoples against the Sandinistas. The Contras 
leveraged the minority-status and long-time neglect of indigenous groups to their 
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advantage. They sought to erode Sandinista authority by turning the population against 
them, and here was a population ready to be turned. 
While the Contras sought the indigenous populations allegiance in an attempt to 
further undermine FSLN authority, the Sandinistas looked to improve the health 
conditions of those who faced relocation. The Sandinistas allocated resources to the 
displaced populations that “in some cases resulted in levels of medical service far 
surpassing those available prior to resettlement, mainly because of the inaccessible 
location of the homelands of the majority of the displaced populations and neglect by the 
Somoza government of rural zones.”146 Those who experienced displacement maintained 
hostility toward the Sandinista government while benefitting significantly from social 
programs around food and health care.147 
Despite efforts to improve health systems for displaced populations, refugees 
remained at risk for poor health and psychological trauma. In 1986, one Managua-based 
task force found “that refugee families’ psychological problems stem not only from the 
war trauma they have undergone, but also from the economic and emotional stresses of 
being uprooted from their social and familial networks.”148 Moreover, refugees who fled 
the country faced not only the associated psychological trauma but also the often poor 
conditions of the refugee camps. In Honduras, many indigenous Nicaraguans faced a 
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government that “tolerated refugees’ presence without offering them any viable means of 
survival.”149 The overwhelming number of refugees moving across Central American 
borders often left governments unable to provide sufficient care. In overwhelmed Costa 
Rican transit camps, established to provide Nicaraguans the tools needed to assimilate, 
“refugees suffered from general ill-health.”150  
The displaced populations of Nicaragua no doubt faced psychological and 
physical trauma. The degree to which they received care depended on their ethnicity and 
the location to which they fled. Access to health care often times improved for those 
displaced within Nicaragua. For those who left the country, the likelihood of receiving 
regular medical treatment was low, particularly in Nicaragua’s overwhelmed Central 
American neighbors.  
2. Displaced Populations of El Salvador 
 Of the estimated one million Salvadorans displaced by the civil war, half were 
internally displaced and half became refugees. Of the half million who became refugees, 
an estimated 25,000 went to Honduran camps, 10,000 to Nicaragua and the rest ended up 
in Mexico or the United States.151 The displaced populations, particularly those that 
remained in El Salvador or ended up in refugee camps, faced high barriers to accessing 
healthcare services. Moreover, displaced populations in El Salvador were often being 
chased by government forces who sought to massacre them, and, if they were unable to, 
cut off all supplies.  
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 Salvadoran peasants, particularly those who lived near or in guerilla-held 
territories, lived in constant danger of being caught in the crossfire or accused of 
collaboration with guerilla groups. When the government raided villages, Salvadorans 
were forced to retreat in what were known as guindas.152 During these periods of 
displacement, silence and discretion were of the utmost importance to the survival of 
Salvadorans on the run. Those hiding from government forces were at times forced to 
take extreme measures in silencing their children. In her book Beyond Displacement: 
Campesinos, Refugees, and Collective Action in the Salvadoran Civil War, Molly Todd 
notes that “the cries of hungry, scared, and otherwise uncomfortable children could 
betray both the presence and the specific locations of the mobile communities [of 
campesinos]. Because silence was so essential to survival, adults frequently had to cover 
children’s mouths to stifle their cries with the unintended result of smothering some 
children to death.”153 International aid helped to curb the number of these tragedies to 
some degree. Campesinos began using various medications and sometimes liquor 
provided to them by international medical personnel in order to keep the children 
asleep.154 In a 1983 interview, Salvadoran nurse, Maria Eugenia, tells the story of how 
she used medication to silence a screaming child in the middle of fleeing an attack. She 
said: 
We provide as much medical attention as possible, even during the retreat. One 
time a compañera was running with a screaming baby in her arms. We knew that 
the army would hear the crying and figure out where we were, so I prepared an 
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injection to put the baby to sleep. Imagine yourself running and having to give an 
injection – without wiping the skin clean or anything! Unfortunately, there was no 
other way to avoid getting caught by the army.155 
 
Still, access to medication could never be guaranteed to peasants hiding or running from 
government forces. 
 Access to medical care rarely improved for Salvadorans if they reached refugee 
camps. One group of foreign doctors who travelled to the Santa Tecla refugee camp, a 
camp for internally displaced Salvadorans located near San Salvador, described its 
residents as living in subhuman conditions with virtually all suffering from illnesses for 
which there was little to no medical care.156 Moreover, many of the diseases from which 
the refugee population at Santa Tecla suffered resulted from malnutrition and poor 
sanitary conditions. According to one Congressional report, USAID reports had 
specifically claimed to be providing humanitarian aid to the Santa Tecla camp mainly in 
the form of nutritious foods. Upon further investigation, Congress reported that no such 
aid could be confirmed to ever have arrived at the camp.157 A 1986 report conducted 
together by the Instituto de Investigaciones and the Instituto de Derechos Humanos at the 
Universidad Centroamericana, stated that 85.4% of refugees wished to remain in refugee 
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camps despite poor conditions because of the safety of the camps.158 Refugee camps 
situated across the border in Honduras presented similar issues of insecurity to those 
located inside El Salvador. A 1982 supplemental report by the Americas Watch 
Committee and The American Civil Liberties Union noted that the Honduran military 
treated refugees and aid workers brutally, and that Salvadoran troops frequently crossed 
the border to capture those suspected of working with the guerillas.159  
 Not all refugees experienced the same levels of service. Canadian solidarity 
activist, Christine Reesor, spent time working in two different camps for internally 
displaced Salvadorans, Betania camp located in La Libertad, and Calle Real located north 
of San Salvador.160 Calle Real, she notes, benefitted from greater food security. She says 
that at Calle Real, refugees “had three meals a day, whereas in the first one [Betania], 
there were only two meals a day.” Moreover, at Calle Real, “there was actually a doctor 
from the archdiocese who came out and provided medical care on site.” At Betania, “the 
medical care was a little more tenuous. There was a nurse, but there wasn’t a defined 
clinic site.” There were, she notes, doctors from the French organization Médecins du 
Monde (Doctors of the World), who “visited the camp on a schedule to provide some 
medical care.”161 Still, the camp at Calle Real had better medical care available for the 
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refugees. But it came at a price. According to Reesor, the Red Cross and Archdiocese 
agreed that wounded FMLN fighters would be treated at the clinic operating in the Calle 
Real camp. While the displaced experienced greater access to care because of that 
agreement, they also faced heightened danger. Reesor states that the presence of the 
clinic “made the camp a target for the Armed Forces.” On January 9, 1988, the Armed 
Forces surrounded the camp fired for an extended period.162 Discrepancies between the 
two camps show just how different access to medical care was for the displaced, even 
when they remained in the same country.  
 The displaced of Nicaragua and El Salvador faced an extra set of hurdles in 
accessing health care. In both cases, the violence, as sponsored by the United States, 
pushed civilians into precarious positions. Not only did refugees suffer greater physical 
harm, they also dealt with the psychological trauma associated with being forced to flee 
or relocate. Not all displacement was created equally. While some experienced more 
consistent access to services, and others even had improved access, trauma and 
uncertainty permeated the lives of all the displaced.  
D. Conclusion 
 The health systems of El Salvador and Nicaragua underwent major changes as a 
result of the revolutions and counterrevolutions of the 1980s. The popular health systems 
that the FMLN and FSLN promoted saw the expansion of community-level health access. 
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In Nicaragua, significant improvements resulted from the new system, while in El 
Salvador, revolutionary forces struggled to maintain health systems in the face of brutal 
government repression. Solidarity workers played an important role in maintaining the 
medical networks and supply chains for each country. Internationalist solidarity propped 
up the community-based revolutionary movement toward healthcare access for all. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 HEALTHCARE SOLIDARITY 
“It’s not really revolutionary, it’s not really transformative unless we transform our 
relationship with power.” 163 – Susan Classen 
 Within the Central American solidarity movement lay a subgroup of doctors, 
nurses, community health workers, and others who sent medicine and essential supplies 
to ensure the functioning of healthcare systems. Some of these activists remained in the 
United States raising funds and awareness. Others recognized the value of their skill set 
and made the journey south to offer a helping hand to those in need. Lois Wessel, an 
activist who lived in Nicaragua from 1985-1991, identified this division in solidarity, 
saying that for “a U.S. citizen, there’s sort of two sides to the solidarity movement. One 
side with people living in the United States and one side with people living, in my case, 
in Nicaragua.”164 There remained, for both groups, a firm belief that the best way to 
combat the violence was by healing. For many activists involved in health care in both El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, there were two main goals. The first was direct: offering 
services as a doctor or nurse to treat sick and injured patients. The most important goal of 
these workers, however, was building up the capacity for health work within 
communities. This was revolutionary work. Sandy Smith-Nonini writes that the building 
of public health capacity in the war zones of El Salvador, “arose in part out of necessity, 
and in part out of the openness to new ideologies created by the polarization and the 
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influence initially of church workers and later of urban and ‘internationalist’ health 
professionals.”165 The internationalists played a central role in promoting the revolution 
that was popular health. 
 This chapter focuses on those solidarity workers who looked to build up the 
healthcare capacity of El Salvador and Nicaragua. They understood that helping to build 
a lasting system would carry far beyond their own capacity to care for individual sick and 
wounded; that solidarity is most effective when those involved see each other as equals; 
that real change is effected through institution building, and such building must be 
steered by those most affected. Moreover, they saw the people of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador as agents of change capable of determining their own needs and improving their 
own situation. Despite the violence Salvadorans and Nicaraguans endured, they wanted 
to improve their lives and their communities, and healthcare solidarity workers helped 
make this improvement possible by engaging with communities in extended and 
meaningful ways. 
A. “Working in the Solidarity Model”  
 As Nicaraguans and Salvadorans defined their revolutionary goals, solidarity 
activists from all over the world stepped in to lend a helping hand. Doctors, nurses, 
community health planners, and other activists made major impacts by offering their 
abilities to achieve community-set healthcare goals. Many of those who became integral 
to improving medical care passionately followed what Dr. Arnold Matlin refers to as the 
“solidarity model.” Matlin explained that this model is when “you work within the 
system, you don’t set up a shop and say here we are bringing you the gifts of American 
                                                
165 Smith-Nonini, Healing the Body Politic, 75. 
 	 57 
medicine. You go to medical people in the community and you say ‘how can we help 
you’ and then they’ll tell you, and then that’s what you should do.”166 Lois Wessel 
decided not to return to Nicaragua after training as a nurse in part because of her 
commitment to community agency. In describing her decision, she states: 
One of the reasons I ended up not going back in that public health capacity was as 
much as I adored the people I worked with, I didn’t want to be the gringo who 
kinda flew in on an airplane and stayed at a nice hotel and told people how to run 
their health projects. I didn’t see myself doing that, I felt like health projects 
needed to be more what the people wanted do and not what the funders wanted to 
do.167 
 
 Focusing on what health goals the people of a community wanted and needed 
made for effective solidarity. Of course, asking the people what they wanted more 
broadly was important, too. Health care, though, was a realm in which the people could 
assert their needs and revolutionary goals, particularly during a decade when health care 
financially and practically took a backseat to warfare. Following the solidarity model, 
then, by working on health care at a grass roots level, or, at the least, with a grass roots 
mentality, helped make the revolutions efficacious. Solidarity workers who clung to this 
model played a pivotal, if not always leading, role in encouraging and assisting in the 
revolutionary health goals of the people. In that way, health care solidarity between the 
U.S., Nicaragua, and El Salvador proved effective and truly radical. 
B. The Work of Health Internationalists  
 Arnold Matlin has been to Nicaragua over thirty-five times since his first visit in 
1988. He still visits Nicaragua every year, and he and his wife continue to support health 
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care in the country. In 2004, Matlin was awarded the Hero of the Revolution award from 
the Sandinistas, the only North American to ever receive such an honor. His commitment 
to supporting the revolutionary goals for health care set out by the Sandinista government 
in the 1980s came alongside his deep belief in following the solidarity model. Matlin 
exemplifies the important work done by healthcare solidarity activists in Central 
America. Many of those who spent time in Nicaragua or El Salvador had a similar 
mindset, and they often worked for, or even started, organizations that funded and 
promoted such grass-roots ways of thinking. This chapter in no way outlines all of the 
people and organizations that committed to medical aid. Instead, it looks to how 
healthcare workers managed to encourage the revolutionary goals of the people through 
their solidarity work.  
1. Exchanging Ideas 
 The Committee for Health Rights in Central America (CHRICA), later 
Committee for Health Rights in the Americas, the National Central America Health 
Rights Network (NCAHRN), MINSA, and Federacion de Trabajadores de Salud 
(Federation of Health Workers, FETSALUD), came together to “support the new 
Sandinista government’s efforts to provide medical care to the impoverished majority,” 
and to “inform the U.S. public of what was taking place.”168 After consulting with 
MINSA and Managua’s medical school, CHRICA decided the most effective course of 
action “was to hold a large colloquium or conference in Managua, which would create a 
forum for exchange among U.S. and Nicaraguan health professionals about state-of-the-
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art medical care.”169 These colloquia, held annually for ten years starting in 1983, 
asserted important moral support for Nicaraguan health workers and “generated myriad 
other collaborative efforts” between the U.S. and Nicaragua.170 
 U.S. and Nicaraguan medical professionals gathered at the North American-
Nicaragua Health Colloquia. U.S.-born public health activist, Maria Hamlin Zuniga, 
noted that the goal of these colloquia was to introduce “the kinds of things that were 
going on in modern medicine that Nicaraguans were not able to get.” Moreover: 
the colloqui[a] dealt with many different kinds of things. People came and helped 
people understand more modern scientific thought on different diseases, helped 
with the women’s groups for sexual health and reproductive health, and for how 
to deal with trauma,… how to deal with anxiety and depression, how to deal with 
the huge number of people who we had who were suffering loss of limbs because 
of the war.171 
 
The colloquia brought healthcare solidarity activists and Nicaraguan health workers 
together to exchange ideas. This gave Nicaraguans, seamed in by sanctions, access to 
content otherwise unavailable to them. The colloquia were held in part to expose U.S. 
health workers to the realities of Nicaraguan medicine. Visiting medical professionals 
saw the progress of the Sandinista policies and the destruction wrought by the Contras, 
and, in response, they returned home eager to advocate in favor of the FSLN.  
 The student newspaper Synapse, published out of the University of California San 
Francisco, wrote of a delegation sent by the university to the October 1982 health 
colloquium. Delegates reported that, “we went to provide updated medical information 
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on a broad range of topics and to observe firsthand the health conditions in the country.” 
They said that “the most important aspect of our experience was the realization that 
Nicaragua is at war.”172 An Ann Arbor publication reported in April 1986, that “North 
American health professionals returning from a recent health colloquium in Managua 
confirm the crisis caused by both the shortage of medical materials and displacement of 
health personnel resulting from the war.”173  
 These delegates returned from Nicaragua with such a sense of injustice that they 
often founded new organizations that helped spur the U.S. outcry against U.S. 
intervention in Central America. According to Matlin, “once we travelled to Nicaragua 
and saw the reality, we were hooked.” In fact, Matlin, along with a colleague, founded 
the Ciudad Hermana Taskforce in response to his initial experience as a delegate. The 
taskforce, which formed a vital sister city link between the Nicaragua town, El Sauce, 
and Rochester, New York, still exists today.174   
 As these examples show, healthcare solidarity was vital to the Central American 
solidarity movement. Though not all organizations were health-focused, all were 
impacted by the voices of delegates who travelled to the country to attend health 
colloquia and witness the reality of health care for a country under siege. The Nicaraguan 
government supported such delegations because they saw how potent such solidarity 
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could be in impacting U.S. policy and curbing the economic squeeze that hindered the 
FSLN’s capacity for change.  
Dr. Jill Winegardner, a neuropsychologist, began travelling to Nicaragua in 1988 
through an organization known as The Training Exchange. Rather than treat patients, the 
goal of the exchange “was to support healthcare professionals who provided training, not 
just service, but [to leave] a legacy of training to their Nicaraguan counterparts.” It was 
through the exchange process that Winegardner was able to return to Nicaragua and 
eventually move there. From the beginning, she was involved in supporting cutting-edge 
growth in the country. She notes that on her first visit, she helped form “a society called 
the Nicaraguan Neuropsychological Society, or Association… of the psychologists who 
had just started learning neuropsychology.”  Additionally, she “taught weekly classes, 
usually at the rehab hospital,… visited the individual psychologists in the class in their 
places of work,… did some tutoring at the University of Central America, and [helped 
with] their theses and their projects in neuropsychology.”175 
For Winegardner, the purpose of her time in Nicaragua was supportive, not 
controlling – assistive, not prescriptive. “It was all training. That was the whole purpose 
of the project, not to do actual clinical work, but to train.”176  Winegardner introduced a 
new field of medical practice to Nicaragua. In that process, she easily could have chosen 
to assert her own expertise and beliefs onto the psychologists she helped to train. But 
Winegardner and the program she worked through understood the significance of 
solidarity and the importance of not domineering, regardless of her own background. 
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2. U.S.-Based Solidarity Actions 
U.S.-based groups often engaged in solidarity by shipping supplies to Central 
America. Nicaraguans struggled to access basic goods as well as medical supplies in the 
face of U.S. sanctions. Winegardner notes that lacking basic supplies was a “constant” 
while she was in Nicaragua. “There was always a problem getting supplies, getting 
goods, getting medicines, getting anything. And in my specialized little area, you know, 
though I didn’t use medicines, the basic materials like paper and pencil, or a typewriter, 
those kinds of things were not always in easy supply.”177 In response, Lois Wessel notes, 
“there were people filling up containers and shipping [them] to Nicaragua that had 
important things, whether it was medicine, or clothing.”178 Groups that raised funds and 
shipped materials to Central America, then, were vital in the maintenance of the 
healthcare system. 
The Nicaragua Medical Aid Project (NMAP) stated as its main goal the collection 
of “medical supplies and money to meet specific requests by health care facilities in 
Nicaragua.” In 1986, the Ann Arbor-based group described its work with Nicaragua as:  
Delivering requested medical supplies to the Hospital Infantil in Managua and to 
rural health centers…repairing microscopes throughout Nicaragua and providing 
spare parts…buying pharmaceuticals at 3% of cost through the Medicines for 
Central America Fund…sending emergency medical kits for use in war zones and 
rural health posts…contributing to the purchase of generators for health care 
facilities needing electric power… [and ]supplying repair parts for U.S. made 
medical equipment.179  
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In April 1986, NMAP participated in a regional caravan that converged in Milwaukee 
with supplies to fill a 20-ton shipping container for Nicaragua.180 In October of the same 
year, NMAP sent a delegation to Nicaragua with “several hundred pounds of medical 
equipment and pharmaceuticals.”181  
 NCAHRN funded organizations capable of delivering medications to Central 
America. The Medicines for Central America Fund (MCAF), sent “hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of supplies” and promised donors that every “dollar donated” 
purchased “$30 of urgently needed medicines.” NCAHRN also worked with Insulin for 
Life in “response to an urgent need in Nicaragua,” to deliver “monthly supplies of 
insulin” to the country (Appendix A).182  
 Many other U.S.-based organizations raised funds and collected materials to send 
to Central American countries, particularly El Salvador and Nicaragua. A 1987 Directory 
of Central America Organizations, published by the Central America Resource Center in 
Austin, Texas, shows that medical support came from a wide geographic spread in the 
United States. Many organizations were based in the big cities of California, in Chicago, 
in New York, and in Boston, but activists organized in smaller regions as well. For 
example, Missoula, Montana hosted the Montana Committee for Health Rights in Central 
America and Medical Aid to Central America was based in Madison, Wisconsin.183 
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These organizations played a vital role in upholding the integrity of medical systems 
constantly threatened by lack of resources. 
3. Organizations without a Focus on Medicine 
 Many solidarity organizations and activists engaged health promotion without 
focusing exclusively on issues of medical access. The Committee in Solidarity with the 
People of El Salvador (CISPES), a prominent U.S.-based organization to present, focused 
on preventing U.S.-invasion, a goal immortalized by the slogan “El Salvador is Spanish 
for Vietnam.”184 Though CISPES focused on political advocacy and broad support of the 
FMLN and grassroots organizing, they also promoted health care via the Bravo Fund. 
The Bravo Fund, in turn, used the money from CISPES to fund training and the 
Alejandra Bravo Field Hospital in Chalatenango.185 
 At times, activists with little background in public health, found themselves 
engaged in healthcare solidarity. Aynn Setright travelled to Nicaragua with Witness for 
Peace (WP) in 1985 with a mind to shift U.S. policy. WP, founded in 1983 in opposition 
to Reagan’s support for the Contras, “brought thousands of people to Nicaragua to 
provide protective accompaniment to communities at risk and to document the effects of 
the U.S.-supported war.”186 Neither WP nor Setright focused exclusively on medicine and 
health, but through WP, Setright found herself driving an ambulance in central Nicaragua 
for a town called Bocana de Paiwas. “Catholic relief services had provided the parish 
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with an ambulance, and the red cross didn’t want to be in that zone because it was too 
conflictual, and MINSA every time they sent an ambulance out, it was ambushed.” The 
parish requested, through WP, that someone be sent to drive the ambulance.187 
C. Solidarity Based in Central America  
In 1982, Maria Hamlin Zuniga, a public health worker who has lived in Central 
America since 1968, helped establish the organization, Centro de Información y Servicios 
de Asesoría en Salud (Center for Information and Advisory Services in Health, CISAS). 
CISAS “was organized to provide health education and work[ed] with communities on 
community empowerment around health.” The organization exists today, and works in 
the cities and surrounding areas of Managua, León, and El Viejo. At the same time as she 
founded CISAS, Hamlin Zuniga worked at MINSA and helped to coordinate 
internationalist solidarity workers to the health programs run by the Ministry. She notes 
that “especially during the 80s, [CISAS] collaborated with the different people who were 
coming to the country to provide services,” though the main bulk of connections CISAS 
made were with “popular organizations, women’s organizations, women, youth, children 
and the community or community defense committees that were set up at that time and 
later were converted into the Nicaraguan Communal Movement [Movimiento Comunal 
Nicaragüense].” 188 
While CISAS remains a community-oriented organization, many solidarity 
workers joined the organization during the 1980s. Hamlin Zuniga has long been adopted 
as a Central American, but she worked with many activists who lived in the region for 
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shorter stints. Lois Wessel became involved in CISAS in the late 1980s and describes the 
organization as “a very hands-on health education center that does a lot of education 
using really participatory techniques, so theater, and dance, and song, to teach.”189  
 Mark Smith, a public health and environmental activist, and Susan Classen helped 
found the Comisión Diocesana de la Pastoral en Salud de Chalatenango (Diocesan Health 
Commission of Chalatenango Province, CODIPSA). Founded in El Salvador in 1988,190 
the organization responded to the health needs of repopulating and repatriating 
populations. CODIPSA, under the protection of the Catholic Church, focused on training 
community health workers and rebuilding the infrastructure that had been destroyed. 
CODIPSA coordinated numerous two-day training sessions, vaccination campaigns, and 
convivencias (two day retreats for volunteer health workers to learn new skills), in 
addition to procuring medicine and supplies from San Salvador.  
 Smith helped coordinate trainings and ensure that medications remained stocked. 
To get the supplies back to Chalatenango, he would leave San Salvador in the early 
morning hours in hopes that guards at the checkpoints would be asleep when he passed 
through. Though he was questioned at times, he never had the medications taken by the 
Salvadoran military. Smith worked on campaigns with CODIPSA where the volunteers 
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carried pingüinos (coolers full of vaccinations) obtained from the Salvadoran Ministry of 
Health into rural Chalatenango.191  
 Both Susan Classen and Mark Smith worked to coordinate and host trainings for 
local health volunteers. This aspect of CODIPSA’s mission focused on the long-term 
goal of health sustainability so important to effective solidarity work. According to 
Smith, the local two-day trainings were created for “semi-literate populations” to 
“recognize and treat disease,” particularly relating to upper respiratory issues and 
parasitic infections.192 Susan Classen worked under CODIPSA in a region called Las 
Vueltas. She was responsible for training health workers in villages located along a 
sixteen kilometer corridor.193  
 Hamlin Zuniga participated in the founding of the Comité Regional de Promoción 
de Salud Comunitaria (Regional Committee for the Promotion of Community Health), an 
organization founded in Guatemala and that worked clandestinely until 1987 when it first 
participated publicly in an International Women’s meeting.194 The idea for a committee 
came about in 1975 and encouraged solidarity between health workers and systems in 
Central America.195 The committee worked largely in secret because of the violence and 
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oppression in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly targeting health 
workers. That same violence made the committee an indispensable resource. In speaking 
about the committee, Hamlin Zuniga noted: “During the years of armed conflict in 
Central America, that particular committee was essential to permit people working in… 
community health, health promotion, [and] health education to come together under very 
difficult circumstances, but to come together and learn from one another, and… it 
continues to work to this day, so obviously it had sustainability.” 
 Hamlin Zuniga emphasized that the committee is not an organization, but rather a 
network. Through this work, Hamlin Zuniga and her colleagues created a vital link 
between health workers of Central American nations that boosted the capacity of each 
country’s respective health system. In explaining the four main activities of the 
committee during the 1980s, Hamlin Zuniga stated: 
The idea was to train community health workers to carry out programs and the 
like because most worked in development programs… One of the purposes of the 
committee was to help these individuals and these organizations that they 
belonged to… What we wanted to do was that in each of the different countries 
[of Central America], they organize themselves in coordination at the national 
level so that they could help one another and then when that was done, they 
became part of a coordinating committee to carry out the strategic planning and 
programming for the committee as a whole. The committee had as its main 
activities regional encounters [meetings] around specific themes that were 
identified by the people who were in the committee and then each country would 
send people to these regional encounters… The third kind of activity that we had 
was the interchange between people working in different programs in different 
countries and that was very important during the repression because that way 
people from countries in conflict could go and live for a while in health programs 
in other countries that were not in conflict and be able to learn from that 
experience. And the fourth kind of activity… was the production and the 
promotion of educational materials.196 
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 The Regional Committee is a healthcare solidarity organization for Central 
Americans, by Central Americans. Hamlin Zuniga and her colleagues recognized the 
revolutionary power of health care, and so they encouraged communities to take charge 
of their physical wellbeing and, consequently, shape Central American revolutions to 
their own needs. In her 2003 popular history of the Regional Committee, Hamlin Zuniga 
chronicles the formation of the committee and its focus on community health, which was 
a response to oppression and a part of the revolutionary actions taken by the Sandinistas 
and the people.197  
D. Cultural and Economic Struggles for Health Internationalists 
“I was pushed to compromise what would be an appropriate level of work… to 
accommodate circumstances [in Nicaragua], but if I did that, I knew the country 
wouldn’t go forward.”198 – Dr. Jill Winegardner 
For each of the workers accounted for here, respecting the wishes, desires, and 
knowledge of local populations was crucial to building effective health systems; the 
activists never placed themselves as central to the process. When asked how she dealt 
with Salvadoran beliefs that directly contradicted her medical knowledge, Susan Classen 
responded, “that was the ocean that we swam in.”199 Classen epitomized a fundamental 
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challenge that healthcare solidarity workers faced. Even as they saw that the best way 
forward was to build health systems according to the needs and desires of communities, 
they struggled with the cultural divisions that existed between their own beliefs about 
medicine and those of the locals. Many of these workers, who had been raised and 
educated in the U.S. or Canada, had difficulty deciding when to push back against 
harmful local practices and when to respect and recognize the efficacy of other practices.  
While working alongside guerilla and community health workers in El Salvador, 
Charles Clements recognized that he “was the only fully educated doctor in the region.” 
Many of the health workers had only basic training in general health, but most were well 
experienced in handling the injuries prevalent in the war zone. Clements recognized his 
own limitations as well as strengths in the situation, and rather than viewing himself as 
the regional expert, he saw his “role as a complement to this system.”200 Even so, friction 
existed for Clements as he navigated his role as a doctor and an outsider.  
Like many healthcare activists, Clements faced a slew of local beliefs detrimental 
to health practices. In his memoir, he writes:  
What I didn’t then understand is that in El Salvador medical treatment is viewed 
as a semi-mystical affair in which every ache or pain is treated with a pill or an 
injection, if possible. The practice is not fostered by doctors; most rural 
Salvadorans have never seen a doctor. It is a result of medicines of every type 
being urged on the people by over-the-counter diagnosticians. Product safety 
regulation is unknown in that country.201 
 
Many other activists echo Clement’s experience. Susan Classen stated that aside from 
traditional “folklore beliefs,” the belief that “injections and IVs are better than pills” 
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permeated the expectations Salvadorans had of medical practitioners.202 Classen also 
encountered misunderstandings about the nature of medications. When talking about 
administering pills to patients, she noted that many misunderstood the differences 
between kinds of pills: “The red pill is better than the brown one, everybody wanted 
vitamins and somebody had a couple leftover antibiotics, so they’d give it to somebody 
else who had a cold.”203 Many of these issues arose because the populations had little 
access to medical care and education prior to the 1980s.  
 Financial realities impacted Central Americans and activists, both in accessing 
supplies and in offering sufficient training. Jill Winegardner noted that in Nicaragua, “the 
financial imperatives… were really severe. So things like, in advanced countries, we have 
private offices, we have telephones, we have paper, we have test materials, we have 
secretaries, we have phones, and there, none of those things would be taken for granted.” 
Access to supplies, including neuropsychological tests, was restricted, but those tests that 
were available often did not fit with financial realities of the patients. Winegardner noted 
that, “for neuropsychology, there’s a lot of norming that has to be done, so a lot of these 
tests didn’t have appropriate norms for use in Nicaragua, so we had to develop some of 
our own norms and think up some of our own tests.” For example, a boy with no formal 
education but with extensive experience selling goods on the streets may not be able to 
pass a test created for a population assumed to have basic math skills, but exchanging 
money would be a task that neuropsychologists could use as a test for him.204  
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 Winegardner’s students also faced financial difficulties that made proper training 
impossible in some cases. In her time training students, she encountered one particularly 
difficult situation: 
I had a pair of students who were doing a thesis and one of them didn’t come to 
the meetings because her family had a little stall at the oriental market there and 
they had gotten robbed a couple times, and so she couldn’t leave it. And so I had 
this dilemma that you wouldn’t have in the U.S. Everyone [in Nicaragua] told me 
to pass her anyway even though she didn’t do the work, because of her family 
difficulty and the financial necessity of her staying at the market. But on the other 
hand, I would perpetuate untrained psychologists, and I really didn’t want to do 
that, so I ended up not passing her, because she hadn’t achieved the level of work 
needed. But people were really angry about that. Those kinds of things have an 
impact on health care as well.205 
 
Healthcare solidarity workers faced difficult and often unpopular decisions like that 
which Winegardner made with her student. Determining when and how to interject 
knowledge and insist on professional expectations was difficult in both El Salvador and 
Nicaragua because of cultural differences, financial difficulties and, most of all, because 
of the violence and oppression facing both populations. Nonetheless, Winegardner, and 
other activists, continued to work within a solidarity model, trying to limit the imposition 
of their own belief systems, listening to the desires of the local community, but also 
choosing to push the healthcare systems forward in effective ways. 
At times, the differing belief systems and regulations allowed activists to help in 
unique ways. While working in Managua, Lois Wessel spent a year apprenticing with a 
Uruguayan obstetrician-gynecologist. Wessel summarized the experience by saying, “I 
would just show up at the hospital when [the OB/gyn] was working and she let me 
deliver babies… that would never happen now, like who the hell are you, someone off 
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the street, delivering babies.”206 Susan Classen notes that in her time as a nurse and then 
training healthcare workers, she and her colleagues “did try hard to work with medicinal 
plants and lift up that kind of response because a lot of those are not just part of the belief 
system, they do actually work. So that was one way of trying to work with and not just 
work against.”207 Promoting natural remedies worked in part because it embraced more 
traditional beliefs and in part because it responded effectively to shortages in medicine. 
However, not all activists found the communities they worked in receptive to the use of 
herbal remedies. In his time in El Salvador, Clements routinely promoted natural options 
that communities were slow to accept: 
The peasants were skeptical at the introduction of natural remedies. Their 
forebears… had been conversant with the pharmacopaeia growing wild around 
them. Almost any of their grandparents had ten times the knowledge of natural 
medicine that I possessed, but that lore had been lost with the advent of easily 
available drug-store remedies. The willow bark tea was slow to catch on, as was 
the sedative we showed them how to brew from the leaves of the mock orange 
tree. Despite the fact that stomach gas, acidity, and ulcer-like pain were common 
complaints, they showed little interest in learning how to prepare an antacid from 
the fine ash of their cooking fires.208 
 
What the two contradicting experiences show about working in the war zones of El 
Salvador is just how adaptable and open-minded healthcare solidarity workers needed to 
be in order to achieve results.  
Dr. Francisco Metzi writes that he became most effective in teaching and 
treatment when he embraced the beliefs of the local populations, rather than fighting or 
ignoring them. He writes: “In the middle of class one day, it suddenly occurred to me that 
I was looking at the problem completely backwards. It wasn’t these young women who 
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should sit back and absorb what I taught, but rather, I should learn from them.” This new 
way of thinking, he says, “radically changed not only my teaching style, but also my 
relationship to the community as a whole… this proved to be the key to making my work 
more useful.”209 Moreover, because Metzi aimed to plant the seeds of a successful 
healthcare system that would take root for the populations of El Salvador he temporarily 
served, he realized that engaging with civilian beliefs was not just more effective, but 
imperative. He writes that the new teaching method had a political imperative achieved 
by “starting from the base of knowledge that already exist[ed] among the people, even if 
it [was] not always interpreted correctly.”210 Building students’ confidence in their own 
medical knowledge and capability would serve the community for longer than Metzi 
realized he could. This way of thinking allowed Metzi to engage the solidarity model on a 
deeper level. Many healthcare activists worked in medicine because they believed that 
contributing their time and skills would help promote the revolution, and though they 
often struggled with cultural and economic restrictions, they remained flexible, finding 
ingenious ways to build lasting networks in Central America. 
E. Clinics and Hospitals: Sites of Revolution 
“The hospitals are the result of a community effort, a symbol of the people’s 
accomplishment.”211 – Francisco Metzi 
Solidarity activists so often found themselves working in medicine because 
hospitals and clinics were sites of revolution. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, medical 
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facilities were considered revolutionary and targeted by the Salvadoran military and the 
Contras, respectively. Building a clinic in the war zones was revolutionary; driving the 
ambulance with sick and wounded on treacherous, land-mine-pocked roads, was 
revolutionary; the very act of seeking out care at a clinic was revolutionary. Most 
importantly, these were sites of revolution not only for the Sandinista and FMLN 
leadership, but also for the people. Communities chose to build health clinics together, 
solidarity workers helped run and train these clinics, and in so doing, the people of 
Central America were taking revolutionary stances against systems of oppression. 
 While working as a doctor and healthcare trainer on the front lines of the conflict 
in El Salvador, Metzi noted the importance of hospitals to Salvadoran communities. 
These hospitals were, he writes, “more like a neighborhood café, where friends get 
together after a late night political meeting.” They resembled small clinics, often piled 
high with trash, and with inconsistent equipment and supplies across different 
communities.212 In El Salvador, communities created these clinics, and, as Metzi notes, 
they were proud of them despite the danger they drew. Metzi states: 
Everyone has contributed something towards [the hospital’s] construction. The 
civilians have pointed out the safest location for it and then helped build it. They 
have also helped carry the wounded there; the crops from their fields have 
supplied its provisions. As for the militiamen and the combatants, they have 
risked their lives to protect it, while teams from logistics have lugged heavy 
backpacks full of medical supplies over dangerous backwoods trails.213  
 
Solidarity workers often took on the role of secreting supplies to the clinics and training 
community workers to staff them. Solidarity workers fit neatly into a broader system that 
brought medical care to war-torn El Salvador and Nicaragua. These workers and 
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community members made the revolutionary goals a reality. The FMLN wanted to 
provide health care for all, but they hardly had the capacity to do so as they carried out 
guerilla operations. It was the people who made the revolution real. 
In Nicaragua, hospitals and clinics served as sites of revolution, as well. In the 
war zones, clinics were attacked by Contras, and so there, too, the very act of seeking 
medical help was revolutionary. Throughout the rest of the country, as the FSLN was 
forced to divert funds and attention away from stated health imperatives, the people 
seized on revolutionary fervor by demanding proper health care. The FSLN provided the 
framework, but the people carried out the daily revolutionary goals. Winegardner saw 
this take place at the government-run, rehabilitation hospital she worked at in Managua. 
She states:  
So Nicaragua was really a country where at that point because of the revolution, 
people were speaking up for their rights, loud and strong so in the rehab hospital, 
one week or two weeks, we couldn’t have classes because the patients went on 
strike because they didn’t like one of the doctors… Nowhere but in Nicaragua is 
that going to happen… The patients won. They said ‘no, this doctor’s not good 
enough, we should get a change’ and that’s what happened… I think that was the 
best example of anything that showed the impact of the revolution on day-to-day 
life. These are hospital patients, they aren’t revolutionary actors or anything, but 
they knew their rights to good health care, and so they demanded them.214 
 
While the patients may not have been revolutionary actors in a traditional way – none 
were guerilla fighters or high-level Sandinistas – they were in fact revolutionary actors. 
They carried out the soul of revolution by demanding better treatment. They were 
Nicaraguan citizens, they were patients, and they were the people who made the 
revolution happen.  
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F. Conclusion 
“Public health was the midwife of Marxism.” 215 –Richard Horton 
 This chapter has posited that the rural clinics and urban hospitals of war-torn El 
Salvador and Nicaragua were key sites of revolution. Healthcare solidarity activists 
played a key role in this revolutionary motion, and they also offered a clear window 
through which to view the efforts of the people. Sandy Smith-Nonini argues that 
“Friedrich Engels’s 1845 study, The Condition of the Working Class in England, was the 
first scholarly effort to examine the health of the public as both materially related to 
capitalist expansion and a site for revolutionary struggle.”216 Though the revolution in 
Nicaragua was not Marxist, the people did see public health in a revolutionary light. The 
FMLN, more firmly grounded in Marxist thought, promoted public health as 
revolutionary, and the people carried out the call. Moreover, U.S. solidarity activists 
turned against the policies and actions of their country to support the health revolutions of 
Central America. Understanding the revolutionary nature of free and accessible health 
care, and the radical idea that community-based health care should be promoted, is 
integral to understanding how the people of El Salvador and Nicaragua experienced and 
engaged with revolution, and why so many healthcare workers and public health 
promoters chose to devote themselves to the cause.  
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CHAPTER 4  
GENDERING SOLIDARITY AND HEALTH CARE 
“Health work helped move women into new social roles, and liberated many from 
patriarchal oversight.”217 – Sandy Smith-Nonini 
The women of El Salvador and Nicaragua navigated the political terrain of the 
1980s by interpreting revolutionary rhetoric as an answer to their particular needs. Health 
care often figured as a central tenet of these feminisms in part because women held 
responsibility for the health of their family and their own reproductive health, and in part 
because women as nurses and volunteer health workers stepped into positions of 
leadership in their communities. This reality looked different in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, but the result in both countries was the creation and mobilization of feminist 
networks that established health clinics, programs, and campaigns to respond to the needs 
of women and their children. In Nicaragua, the state often supported the efforts; in El 
Salvador, the guerillas and civilian revolutionaries worked together to promote a feminist 
agenda. As women navigated the complexities of wartime in both countries, they stepped 
into positions of leadership as healthcare workers in both hospitals and community 
clinics. As revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries fought over ideologies including 
the right to access health care, women made those rights a reality for themselves, for their 
children, and for their communities.  
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A. Scholarship  
Scholarship disagrees over whether women actively constructed a space for their 
needs within the revolutionary movements of Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Some feminist 
scholars have argued that the revolutions were less a breaking of chains for women and 
more a restructuring of power for men, which resulted in a relative shift for women. In 
1985, Maxine Molyneux wrote of Nicaragua that “if the revolution did not demand the 
dissolution of women’s identities, it did require the subordination of their specific 
interests to the broader goals of overthrowing Somoza and establishing a new social 
order.”218 Rather than challenging gender roles, Molyneux argued that to “the traditional 
roles of housewife and mother have been added those of full-time wage worker and 
political activist,” meaning that women continued to support traditional gender roles 
while also propagating the revolutionary state. 219 This argument is indicative of 
Molyneux’s idea of feminine versus feminist. Molyneux, and others after her, have 
argued that “Feminine demands alleviate women’s roles as caretakers, while feminist 
demands explicitly challenge sexism.”220  
Scholarship also criticizes the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses ‘Luisa 
Armanda Espinoza’ (Association of Nicaraguan Women Luisa Armanda Espinoza, 
AMNLAE), the prominent Nicaraguan women’s organization under the FSLN. Jennifer 
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Leigh Disney argues that “a patriarchal political culture” permeated and impeded the 
AMNLAE.221  
In El Salvador, argues Ilja A. Luciak, women “joined the FMLN to change 
prevailing social conditions, and almost all of them served in supporting roles.”222 Even 
so, women “constituted 27 to 34 percent of the FMLN membership.”223 Minimizing these 
women’s contributions by saying that they held primarily supporting roles is a disservice. 
Their decision to support the FMLN in whatever capacity developed from a nuanced set 
of choices and ideas about their position in Salvadoran society; they pursued their own 
needs, whatever roles they accepted. Moreover, women in health care often played 
leading roles, a fact ignored by scholars who assume that women were relegated to 
subordinate positions. 
Other scholarship argues that women navigated the revolutions in ways that 
benefitted them. Diana Carolina Sierra Becerra contends that Salvadoran women defined 
their own feminist praxis through the Asociación de Mujeres de El Salvador (Association 
of Women of El Salvador, AMES).  Sierra Becerra claims that AMES “redefined 
socialist revolution to mean the overthrow of both capitalism and patriarchy, and 
mobilized women to shape the everyday and long-term trajectory of the revolutionary 
process.”224  She notes that AMES organized “combatants, peasants, and militants in 
exiles,” alongside solidarity workers “from Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the 
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United States,” to develop new feminist practices of revolution.225 Further, she argues 
that the feminist-feminine dichotomy “can obscure their intimate relationship.”226 This 
chapter follows with Sierra Becerra’s interpretation by assuming that the health needs of 
women and their children were both a feminist and a feminine issue, but that women 
chose to use health care as platform from which to engage feminist ideology. 
Margaret Randall argues that in Nicaragua, “women developed a consciousness of 
themselves as women and of the important role they could play in the fight against 
Somoza.”227 In prefacing her collection of interviews with Sandinista women, Randall 
states that the women’s stories “force us to stretch the notion of what is political so as to 
include issues usually hidden and dismissed as personal.”228 This includes women’s 
efforts to develop community health programs that focused on women’s and children’s 
health. 
 Considering how women engaged with health care offers one way of 
understanding the revolutions of the 1980s. In both countries, women pursued the 
development of healthcare systems that responded to their and their family’s needs. Even 
as violence limited resources and destroyed infrastructure, women prioritized health 
needs as mothers, health workers, and solidarity activists. They chose to interpret 
revolutionary ideology in their favor, and they embraced opportunities for leadership that 
broke with more traditional ideas about the role of women.  
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Women took up the call for universal health care access for themselves and their 
children, not in order to carry out the requests of men. Sierra Becerra argues that AMES 
developed a feminist praxis that embraced women’s health issues as central to the efforts 
of shaping the Salvadoran revolution. Moreover, women centered reproduction and in 
“the guerilla territories and refugee camps, AMES politicized reproductive labor.”229 
Sierra Becerra further contends that “the top FMLN leadership did not monopolize the 
goals of the revolution.”230  In Nicaragua, the FSLN pursued access to health care as a 
central tenet, but women defined what that care looked like, and in the process, they 
carved out new leadership roles for themselves. Women’s reproductive needs, and the 
health needs of their children, were hardly subordinate to the male rallying cries in either 
country. This chapter assesses how women came to understand their place in society 
differently in part because of newly developing healthcare systems.  
B. Gendered Impacts of Healthcare Instability 
Violence and revolution impacted women’s health more drastically than men’s 
because of women’s entrenched position as reproductive laborers in Salvadoran and 
Nicaraguan society. As women faced different physical realities than their male 
counterparts, they also responded in ways to address those reproductive health needs and 
the health needs of their children. The reality for women in both El Salvador and 
Nicaragua was a greater physical toll, a rupture with traditional ways of life, and inhibited 
access to health care. Understanding how women fit into the revolution is essential to 
untangling their relationship with healthcare development.  
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1. El Salvador 
While the FMLN promoted gender equality and access to health care, the 
Salvadoran government saw neither as important tenets. Even as the FMLN attempted to 
implement healthcare networks in the guerilla-controlled areas, violence and lack of 
access to medical supplies made the task difficult. For many Salvadoran women, this 
either meant an inability to afford health care in the government-controlled hospitals or a 
shortage of care in the guerilla-controlled territories.   
The Salvadoran government targeted poor and indigenous women by denying 
health care and by imposing ideas about reproductive health that built on racist and 
classist notions. A group of American doctors writing on the state of maternal health in 
1982 reported on a state-run facility: 
At the Maternity Hospital [sic] we observed about 20 women in various stages of 
labor. Two or three women occupied each bed. Women in labor sat together on a 
hard bench until shortly before delivery, when they walked up a steep flight of 
stairs to the delivery room. If they could not pay the fee for admission to the 
hospital and for medications,they [sic] were sent home immediately after they had 
delivered.231  
 
Sterilization of these women was an issue in El Salvador.  “In a 1981 bulletin, [The 
Reproductive Rights National Network] reported on the forced-sterilization campaigns of 
the US government against both American and Salvadoran women.” Sierra Becerra 
argues that the Salvadoran government “did not forcibly sterilize women,” but that “it did 
actively promote sterilization over other means of contraception.”232 At the very least, the 
threat of sterilization kept women away from state-run hospitals. Susan Classen notes that 
during her time working as a nurse and public health promoter in Chalatenango, she 
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encountered many women afraid of sterilization. According to Classen, “At every step 
hospital workers try to convince the women to be sterilized.”233 Classen’s observations 
indicate that the reality for many women was a choice between harassment and receiving 
care or avoiding the discomfort but forfeiting medical care. 
Moreover, state-run hospitals at times dismissed the suffering of poor women 
using racist and classist logic. Classen tells of one poor woman, Felícita, who only saw a 
doctor after her fifth visit to the hospital, and only when Classen went with her. Felícita 
needed surgery for a prolapsed uterus and was able to get the blood needed for the 
surgery because Classen “was a foreigner with influence.”234 Another woman named 
Marta watched her twelve-year old daughter waste away from malnutrition and diarrhea. 
Marta and her daughter had been turned away by doctors at the hospital who kicked them 
out because they were “dirty Indians”. Classen argues that Marta was “considered the 
scum of the earth, poor, an Indian, a woman, displaced, no husband,” and that her 
daughter was “killed by the violence of poverty.”235 
The lack of health care for families burdened women more than men. “Older 
women, mothers with young children, and elderly persons comprised a significant portion 
of civilians within the liberated territories.”236 The limited infrastructure in place for 
Salvadoran peasants prior to the violence of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in poor health 
that was only exacerbated with the mass destruction of the war years. Young children 
suffered malnutrition in high rates, a reality that fell upon women to manage. Marta, 
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whose 12-year old daughter died in part due to malnutrition, took on the entire burden of 
caring for her sick child. Marta’s husband was recently deceased, and the woman had 
barely been able to scrape together the money for bus fare to the hospital, much less 
medicine and substantial nourishment for the sick child.237 Marta’s story illustrates the 
reality for many poor women in a country where malnutrition affected as much as 80% of 
the population of children under five.238  
Women also faced more frequent displacement than men. “Women outnumbered 
men in the refugee camps, sometimes three or four to one.”239 It follows that the 
psychological and physical trauma of displacement disproprortionately impacted women 
and their children . Moreover, the guindas forced families to forego regular access to 
medicine or food, which particularly impacted young children and infants.  
Women suffered more when proper health measures failed, and they gained more 
with even minor improvements to the system. Because of their unique relationship to 
health care, women often championed progress in their local health system in ways that 
both fit with the revolutionary agenda (and went against the agenda of the Salvadoran 
government) and reconfigured ideals to match with their particular needs. 
2. Nicaragua 
Nicaraguan women faced a vastly different set of circumstances than their 
Salvadoran counterparts. The FSLN strived for gender equality and aimed to establish 
universal health care. Where Salvadoran women faced heightened oppression, 
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Nicaraguan women saw a series of legal changes that promoted their equality in society 
and in the family. “The Provision Law of 1982,” for example, “attempted to redefine 
family responsibilities, making all adult family members legally liable to contribute to the 
maintenance of their family.”240 The reality proved less than equitable. Even as 
legislation strove for greater gender equality, women remained largely responsible for 
domestic care. Further, as men were drawn into a continuous war with the Contras, 
women found themselves both working outside the home and taking on full responsibility 
for their households.241 
Tasked with the practical, emotional, and spiritual upkeep of their families, 
Nicaraguan women bore the brunt of major economic and political upheaval of the late 
twentieth century. In an interview with Margaret Randall, Gloria Carrión, a Sandinista, 
described the significance of women in maintaining Nicaraguan families and the impact 
of crises on mothers: 
Women are the pillars of their families. This is the most fundamental and 
objective condition of Nicaraguan women’s lives, and perhaps of Latin American 
women in general. We don’t see ourselves simply as housewives, caring for our 
children, attending to the duties of the home and subordinating ourselves to our 
husbands. Women are the centres of their families – emotionally, ideologically 
and economically… Nicaraguan women make up a large percentage of our 
agricultural workers, accounting for half of our fieldworkers. In many instances 
they are the first to be affected by unemployment, inflation and shortages.242 
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As the main providers for their family, women were also the first to be affected by health 
crises, lack of medical resources and professionals, and shortages which induced serious 
medical conditions like malnutrition.  
 Psychological trauma from the war had a particular impact on women and 
children. According to one health journal, Nicaraguan children had “become preoccupied 
with issues of war.”243 Women, in particular, faced heightened levels of anxiety and 
depression in response to the loss of sons and daughters.244 As heads of households, 
women were tasked with the emotional burden of caring for traumatized children and 
dealing with the loss of husbands, sons, daughters, and other family members. Though all 
members of Nicaraguan society were at risk for mental health problems, women’s 
position in the home amplified the trauma they faced. 
 As health care improved, Nicaraguan women often stood to gain the most. The 
success of vaccination campaigns, hydration stations for young children, and increased 
access to family planning methods all improved the lives of Nicaraguan women 
significantly.245 The stagnation in these programs due to warfare, then, inhibited the 
liberation for women that came along with improved health care. However, women 
continued to push for improved healthcare services, even as limitations constricted the 
growth of state-run programs.  
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The limitations placed on the state as it responded to the Contra War often came 
in the form of limited health care for women and children. Health brigadistas were 
community-level health workers trained to provide for basic health needs throughout the 
country. This popular organizing of health workers was effective in Nicaragua, but it 
underwent important changes in response to the Contra War. As the U.S.-backed 
counterrevolutionaries wreaked havoc on parts of Nicaragua, the health brigadistas 
changed their focus to “first aid and acute emergency care”. In response, by July 1984, 
“the training of mother-child Brigadistas had lagged.”246  
Women inhabited the central role in running Nicaraguan households, as solidarity 
activists, and in developing and implementing effective health programs throughout 
Nicaragua. This chapter argues that new conceptions of a woman’s role in society 
flooded in from healthcare solidarity activists, from Sandinistas who went abroad 
(particularly female Sandinistas), and from Nicaraguan women who found themselves 
thrust into new leadership roles to develop community health programs.  
C. Women Working in Health 
Women were mobilized in health care roles as brigadistas in Nicaragua and as 
sanitarias in El Salvador. The Salvadoran sanitarias were often “Young peasants, usually 
girls… trained in basic health care in the guerilla hospitals, and sent back to the villages 
to administer first aid and to treat some of the common illnesses, as well as run public 
health education campaigns on, for example parasites or vitamins.”247 In Nicaragua, the 
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state took on the responsibility of training and organizing the brigadistas. The women in 
these roles participated in state-sanctioned revolution while also expanding on their role 
as women in society. In El Salvador, revolutionary Salvadorans and solidarity workers 
trained the young sanitaria/os so that their role as health workers was revolutionary from 
the beginning. Women who served as leaders and healers continued to push against 
traditional gender boundaries; they worked to define their own ideas of revolution and 
worked to administer the needs they saw as necessary.  
Women participated in other healthcare roles, too. They acted as nurses, doctors, 
community health promoters, hospital union members, and international solidarity 
workers and promoters. In Nicaragua, they worked through the state to expand healthcare 
access. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, women also worked with international 
organizations, with the Catholic dioceses of their communities, with their local health 
clinics, and with women’s organizations. In many cases, women stepped out of more 
traditional roles and into positions of leadership in order to develop healthcare systems 
that were necessary for their communities, their families, and themselves. Women 
stepped into leadership positions in order to get what they needed, but in doing so, they 
also defined the revolutions of both countries. 
1. El Salvador 
Women challenged their position both in the revolutionary zones and government 
controlled areas of El Salvador. Nursing in either region gave women a position of 
authority from which to pursue improved conditions as workers, as women, and as 
Salvadorans. Women working as nurses in the government-controlled areas and hospitals 
engaged in disobedience against the state. These subversive actions carried out under the 
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nose of the brutal of the Salvadoran forces allowed women to define their own ideas of 
womanhood without the support of the revolutionaries. In other words, women in El 
Salvador pressed for improvements in their lives regardless of their geographic relation to 
the war. Nurses on both sides held positions of power and influence that allowed them to 
engage new and changing narratives of power that women expressed.  
Francesca Romero discovered union work through her role as a nurse at the Social 
Security Hospital in San Salvador. In 1976, she became an original member of the 
Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro (Social the Union of 
Salvadoran Social Security Institute Workers, STISSS).248 Despite the repression from 
armed forces and fear that her family and fellow nurses had for her safety, she became 
the only woman alongside seventeen men of the union’s coordinating committee in 1982. 
Romero worked to engage more women (comprising over half of the hospital staff) in 
union work, and she began planning parties and social events aimed at engaging women; 
her efforts paid off, and, in 1985, she and other female hospital staff founded a women’s 
committee as part of STISSS.249 The women’s committee created a newsletter and 
continued engaging women through targeted efforts. The men of the STISSS questioned 
the social aspect of Romero’s campaign, and they also wondered why the women’s 
committee insisted on having a separate newsletter. The women, Romero said, wanted to 
“express [their] thoughts, and talk about the union and about women’s problems and how 
to deal with them.”250  
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Romero and her fellow healthcare workers defined their own needs within the 
STISSS and pushed for an expansion of union practices that matched with the needs of 
the majority of the hospital’s staff. These women engaged a feminist rhetoric in 
expanding their union and their hospital, and in working in solidarity with other unions in 
El Salvador and Central America. Despite the considerable danger all union members 
faced under the repressive Salvadoran regime, particularly during the war years, these 
women considered the struggle for change paramount to the threat of violence. Romero 
saw her work as honest and beneficial, and believed that if she “was going to be killed, 
that’s the way it would be.”251 
Women responded specifically to the gendered violence they encountered. In El 
Salvador, state repression manifested in the “gendered ways in which military officials 
targeted their victims.”252 Feminist solidarity between the U.S. and Central America 
developed partially on the basis of reproductive rights and health. “In short, women 
intervened to make the revolution relevant to their own lives and dreams.”253 
In El Salvador, women organized through AMES to change their conditions and 
interpret the revolution in their favor. Sierra Becerra notes that in the first three years 
after AMES was formed, they “mainly organized urban-based women, demanding equal 
salaries for women, employment, the lowering of food prices, and an end to forced 
sterilizations.”254 However, as “early as 1981, they began organizing popular councils to 
manage their immediate survival needs, such as security, food, and health.”255 The 
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women’s organization responded to state violence by establishing “peasant militias and 
popular health clinics and schools... The clinics treated both serious injuries from 
government bombings and curable diseases such as diarrhea.”256 The association not only 
wanted to carry out the goals of the revolution, it wanted to do so in a way that benefitted 
women. In particular, AMES “encouraged the popular clinics to address women’s health 
needs.”257 Focusing on women’s health was both in keeping with the revolutionary 
agenda for free and universal health care and a manifestation of women’s particular goals 
for the revolution. Women demanded a place by focusing, at least in part, on their health 
needs.  
Clara Méndez wrote of her time as a nurse and head of an FMLN hospital in 
Chalatenango. She began supporting the revolution in 1977 in part because she saw that 
“the democratic revolutionary movement had achieved great maturity in not 
discriminating according to sex, color or class.”258 She established a mobile clinic in San 
Salvador that put her and her family at great risk. From 1987 to 1991, she served as 
“Director of an FMLN hospital in Chalatenango, overseeing the work of all the staff in 
the area.”259 
Salvadoran women took charge in refugee camps, as well. They addressed needs 
particular to them by establishing “Committees for Women and Mothers to address issues 
specific to these groups such as maternal health and child care. These committees became 
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integrated into the general camp government structure.”260 Molly Todd argues that as 
refugees, “women participated in community life and moved into leadership positions to 
an extent far beyond what they previously had done at home in northern El Salvador.”261  
Women took on a variety of roles in El Salvador as they carved out spaces for 
themselves. They pursued care for their families and in so doing, they developed new 
ideas of revolution, gender, health care and leadership. Though the women of Nicaragua 
often had the support of the state, they, too, carved out new places for themselves in 
pushing for health care that met their needs. 
2. Nicaragua 
Women took on the burden of implementing the new health system even as the 
FSLN funneled resources toward the Contra War. The women saw need in their 
communities and so worked as Sandinistas, community health planners, and solidarity 
workers to ensure that the goals of the revolution would be met on their terms. As the 
Sandinista revolution broke down traditional gender roles, women reimagined their 
worlds; they challenged gendered boundaries even as husbands and state leaders moved 
to reestablish gendered expectations. Women used health as a method for expanding their 
new sense of self. They reinterpreted their reproductive labor, stepped into positions of 
authority as health planners and health volunteers, and demanded improved services for 
themselves and their children in spite of the ongoing war. 
Nicaraguan women were deeply involved in the political discourse of their 
country, whether through the intentional support of the FSLN or as wives whose 
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husbands left to fight. Already the economic and emotional backbone of the country’s 
households, they found their voices under the Sandinistas. Nora Astorga, who served as a 
chief prosecutor of Somoza-era war criminals and later the FSLN ambassador to the 
United Nations,262 explained that women’s involvement in the revolution ensured that 
they would continue to actively participate in Nicaraguan politics. Astorga stated that, 
“Women won’t be apathetic again”, implying a significant shift in what women accepted 
as their role in society.263 Mónica Baltonado, a revolutionary and Sandinista (and one of 
only three women to be awarded the title Commander Guerilla immediately following the 
revolution), said that it “wasn’t until [the revolution triumphed] that [women] started to 
think about [their], about [their] historically unequal condition and about the need to fight 
for women’s rights.”264 Randall notes that “Revolution is the only force capable of 
transforming the structure of society,” and that after the Sandinista Revolution the 
Nicaraguan people were able to “break the chains of dependence and begin to participate 
as ‘architects of their liberation’.”265 The revolution in Nicaragua opened up pathways for 
leadership and community building that many women were unable to access previously.  
Aynn Setright, an American solidarity worker, echoed Randall’s ideas of a 
changing landscape for Nicaraguan women when she discussed the empowerment and 
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the consequences that came along with community building in rural Nicaragua. She notes 
that of the eight hundred families she worked with, “many were female-led households 
because the men had been killed during the war, and even if they did have a husband or a 
brother at home, those men were often drafted or recruited into the army, so these sixteen 
communities were led by women”. Many of the women who led the new community 
building efforts had never attended school, spoken in public or otherwise been in a 
position of leadership.  
As women were thrust into positions of authority, they began asking for the 
reproductive health care they needed. Women who previously deferred to their husbands 
now found themselves in a position to demand things for themselves, partially because 
they had no choice, but also because they now felt empowered. Aynn Setright discusses 
how the women she worked with in rural communities had previously lived isolated lives 
where they had little choice but to birth children as they came. That changed when the 
women were asked what they wanted and needed in their communities.  According to 
Setright, “women’s reproductive health was a big thing for them, they always came back 
to that.”266 Milú Vargas, a lawyer and Sandinista, saw an explosion in feminist rhetoric 
starting in 1987. At that point, women across classes became vocal in their “concerns 
about motherhood, abortion, family planning, abuse, rape and labor laws… these issues 
were seen differently by women in different sectors… but we needed to address them 
according to who and where we were.”267 Reproductive health, decriminalizing abortions, 
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and accessing family planning services were, for women of all classes, important 
revolutionary issues. 
D. Motherhood in Revolution 
 As the traditional heads of household in both El Salvador and Nicaragua, women 
were tasked with the health and wellbeing of themselves and their children. Practically, 
this meant that women faced not only their own poor health in times of difficulty but also 
the poor health of their children. In impoverished areas that lacked basic infrastructure, 
women dealt with high levels of malnutrition in their young children and struggled to 
obtain appropriate medical care for them. Symbolically, women’s worth was often 
defined through motherhood. At times, the state defined their worth this way, and at other 
times, women addressed revolutionary goals by becoming mothers. The deep tie between 
motherhood and health care (the care required for reproduction and that needed for 
children) made health care an important site of organization for women and their 
revolutionary goals. Motherhood was for some a burden, and for others the main focus of 
revolution. But the integral link between Salvadoran women, Nicaraguan women, and 
their role as mothers gave them a reason to focus their revolutionary goals on health care. 
1. El Salvador 
Motherhood was important to many Salvadoran women. This was evidenced in 
the speeches, memoirs, and interviews women gave during and after the war years. Many 
women included discussions on their children, positive and negative, and some even 
claim their children as the reason behind their revolutionary choices. Women dealt with 
motherhood in vastly different ways, but the significance of motherhood to Salvadoran 
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women relates to how women approached healthcare needs and their own role in defining 
community health care. 
Clara Méndez, head of the hospital in Chalatenango in the late 1980s, peppers her 
autobiographical statement with mentions of her children. She claims that her initial 
decision to support the revolutionary forces was because of her position as a mother of 
five.268 She proudly notes that her daughters went on to become nurses and “serve the 
neediest and most exploited class.”269 Maria Eugenia, also a Salvadoran nurse, similarly 
discusses her two daughters throughout the interview she gives on her time as a nurse.270  
Moreover, AMES spent time promoting childcare in Managua for Salvadoran 
refugees. As Sierra Becerra observes, the “‘Luz Dilian Arévalo’ childcare… center 
provided for the ‘medical, nutritional, and psycho-emotional needs’ of children and 
promoted social skills that departed ‘from sexist traditions’ and advanced the goals of 
‘equality, mutual respect, and collective decision making’.”271 The care of children 
remained central to women’s identities both practically and philosophically.  
While in Nicaragua, the FSLN promoted motherhood, the FMLN discouraged it. 
The “FMLN leadership maintained that deep emotional bonds limited the willingness of 
their combatants, both women and men, to take risks. They therefore developed policies 
that the women thought went a long way towards preventing the formation and 
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consolidation of couple relationships.”272 The precarious position of the FMLN and the 
rough living conditions of the combatants made pregnancy a liability. Smith-Nonini 
witnessed instances of pregnancy among female sanitarias (health workers) “who 
frequently spent months traveling with a platoon of mostly male combatants.” This 
reality presented itself despite FMLN “policies promoting the use of birth control pills or 
IUDs,” and in response, “the Frente would help [these women] either settle in a civilian 
community or leave the war zone.”273 In a region that struggled to access even the most 
basic health care, reproduction was dangerous not only to the cause but also the mother 
and child. Motherhood, then, remained important to Salvadoran women as part of their 
upbringing, but the violence of the 1980s eroded the role of it in society.  
2. Nicaragua  
The FSLN invoked motherhood as central to the female role in promoting 
democracy, fighting poverty, and fighting off the foreign influence of the United States. 
The conflict allowed women to push the boundaries even as the new government 
continued to see women’s main role as reproductive. The official Sandinista position 
toward women focused on motherhood that both defined women’s relevance in narrow 
and problematic ways and also ensured a successful campaign for greater reproductive 
and child health.  
The FSLN used propaganda posters to equate being revolutionary with being a 
mother. One poster published by the Asociacion de Niños Sandinistas (Association of 
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Sandinista Children) exclaims “Felicidades Mama: Gracias Madre por Defender Nuestra 
Alegría” (“Congratulations Mama: Thanks Mom for Defending our Joy”).274 The image 
depicts a young woman, firearm slung over her back, holding a smiling baby and 
corralling two blissfully happy young children in front of her. The scene links revolution, 
femininity, and motherhood. That this woman was apparently able to take up arms in 
favor of the Sandinista forces while pregnant and raising two young children is nothing 
short of remarkable.  
A more famous image taken in 1984 by Orlando Valenzuela depicts a Sandinista 
fighter as she nurses her child. The woman in the image smiles broadly, indicating that 
many women embraced ideas of revolutionary motherhood was promoted by the FSLN. 
The image, referred to as madre armada y niño (armed mother and child) played an 
important role in developing the state-sanctioned boundaries of the ‘new woman’ in 
Nicaragua. Penélope Plaza Azuaje argues that images like these, along with a number of 
other murals commissioned by AMNLAE, served to promote new gender roles and 
definitions of womanhood.275 That AMNLAE was so heavily influenced by patriarchal 
political expectations explains why many of the murals linked motherhood, revolution, 
and womanhood. At the center of women’s new expected identity was motherhood and 
the promotion of the nation to the next generation.  
The mother in both images was not only the protector of her children, but also the 
protector of her nation. The nationalist imagery was clear: women should have children 
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to strengthen the nation, and they should defend the nation as they would those children. 
Bertha Inés Cabrales notes in an interview for the Global Feminisms Project that women 
faced a tremendous pressure to have children at a young age. As a woman heavily 
involved in the Sandinista revolution, Cabrales, too, experienced the pressure, but had a 
son at twenty-four, an age considered old to be having a first child.276 She indicates that 
the pressure was not for her to get married and then have her child, but rather to have a 
child as soon as possible. Having children, more than getting married, seemed to be a 
marker for Cabrales and her peers of their success as women and as revolutionaries. 
Although, as Cabrales points out, sexual relations outside of marriage were scandalous in 
Nicaragua at the time, the Sandinistas ushered in the tide against that sort of 
conservatism. Reproduction, not attachment to a man, defined Cabrales’ story and the 
images of the two mothers used as Sandinista propaganda. New definitions of 
womanhood were being etched out of old ones. Where Cabrales traditionally would have 
sought out marriage first, she found herself being pressured instead to have a child; where 
womanhood would not have included cargo pants and a gun, it now clearly did.   
Some women felt that having children limited their ability to support the 
revolution. Julia García was a poor woman living in Managua’s slums who identified 
strongly with the need for reform in her country. With five children to care for, she 
struggled to continue her revolutionary activities. She stated that, “It wasn’t easy being 
politically active with my kids and all. I nearly abandoned them, not because I wanted to, 
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but in order to fight for what we have now.”277 García, like many Nicaraguan women, 
was stuck between her traditional responsibilities at home and her desire for a better 
world for herself and for her children. The FSLN may have promoted motherhood, but 
the reality for women was often a movement away from their roles as mothers. García is 
but one example of a revolutionary woman who navigated the tricky relationship between 
motherhood and revolution.  
The focus on motherhood led to a focus on improving child and maternal health. 
Solidarity groups and Nicaraguan activists targeted the high infant and maternal mortality 
rates that existed throughout the country and particularly in rural sectors.278 As 
Nicaraguan women came together and began questioning their own place in society, they 
asked for more and developed new understandings of gender. Just as the Sandinistas 
imprinted a particular idea of motherhood and gender upon Nicaraguan women, so, too, 
did solidarity activists bring with them particular gendered ideals when they volunteered 
in Nicaragua. The confluence of these new ideas and experiences allowed women to 
advocate for themselves in important ways, despite attempts from leadership to reassert 
gendered boundaries.  
E. Gendered Solidarity in El Salvador and Nicaragua 
Nicaraguan and Salvadoran activists who travelled abroad to build solidarity 
networks came back with new ideas about femininity and sexuality that helped further 
push at gender norms. Cabrales travelled to Sweden in the late 1970s. “In Sweden,” 
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Cabrales noted, “we started to strengthen the committees in solidarity with the 
Nicaraguan people.”279 After the revolution, Cabrales returned to Nicaragua where she 
created programs that focused on women’s access to healthcare, including abortion, a 
topic that was more widely accepted in Sweden than in Nicaragua, particularly prior to 
the revolution. Cabrales brought back with her important ideas about family planning and 
access to reproductive health care, but also how women should be “muy libres” in their 
sexual experiences.280 That women should have a choice over their sexuality, including 
access to abortion and family planning, broke with the traditional ideas of femininity and 
motherhood in Nicaragua. Family planning had become more accessible and acceptable 
under the Sandinistas, but sexual pleasure and abortion remained taboo. Setright notes 
that in her time working in rural communities, she never discussed abortion, mainly 
because it was illegal, but also because “it wasn’t part of the discourse.”281 Nonetheless, 
Nicaraguan women, like Cabrales, continued to push the boundaries of Nicaraguan 
culture and of Sandinista politics to ensure that these new ideas of liberation permeated 
the new healthcare system being built.   
While activists who left their country returned new ideas about gender roles, 
solidarity organizations from around the globe funneled their own ideas about women’s 
health into Central America. Sierra Becerra argues that, in El Salvador, “Part of AMES’ 
support in the United States came from reproductive rights organizers. The Reproductive 
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Rights National Network advocated a broad vision of reproductive justice, defending 
access to abortion and contraception, while simultaneously denouncing forced 
sterilizations and cutbacks of social services that pushed pregnant mothers into 
poverty.”282 Other U.S.-based organizations supported revolutionary goals of promoting 
women in leadership. The FMLN Women’s Paramedic Training Project, funded by the 
Bravo Fund through CISPES, educated poor women in basic literacy and medicine. The 
project, started in 1990, came at the end of the conflict in El Salvador, but in just one year 
provided fifty women with their “first opportunity to learn to read and write,” and placed 
them in the field as “core medical personnel” where they helped “organize the medical 
system.” The program took both a local and gendered approach, promoting a 
“community-wide approach to health” and placing “special emphasis on women’s, infant 
and family health.”283 
From 1988 to 1990, Lois Wessel worked in Nicaragua’s Department of Maternal 
and Child Health through an organization called Ipas, based in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina. The official reason for her work was the reduction of maternal mortality in the 
country, but they also, less openly, promoted access to safe abortion. She described the 
organization by saying: “It’s really an abortion rights organization that looked at things to 
reduce maternal mortality from self-induced abortion both from post-partum hemorrhage, 
and it does this looking both at policy and access to abortion services.”284 Abortion was 
illegal in Nicaragua, however, and so Ipas promoted education of procedures that were 
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used for gynecological purposes as well as abortion. In describing this work, Wessel 
stated:  
Ipas promoted the use of a vacuum aspiration syringe that could be used for many 
different gynecological procedures and it didn’t take any electricity and it was 
able to be cold sterilized… It was promoted for when there are pieces of the 
placenta that don’t come out when the baby’s born or when someone’s got some 
kind of dysfunctional uterine bleeding, but everyone knew you could also use it to 
terminate early on. So we taught this technology, and on the official line was that 
we were using it for all these other medical problems, but anyone who learned 
could also use it for abortions. But at the same time, the very active women’s 
movement was also working on this in their own abortion clinics that existed and 
probably still exist today that were not part of the Ministry of Health.285 
 
Abortion was a particularly important issue for many women, as they saw the right to 
choose a pregnancy as lining up with revolutionary ideology.  Ideas about abortion, and 
the means that funded abortion capabilities, often came through internationalist solidarity 
workers. 
 In her time at the Ministry of Health, Wessel also worked on improving record 
keeping and statistical understandings of maternal health. For example, it was common 
practice at the Ministry to “write that a woman died of hemorrhage or infection,” but not 
to indicate whether it was “from a self-induced abortion,… a back-alley abortion,… a 
poorly managed pregnancy, [or] hemorrhage after delivery.” Encouraging better record 
keeping was an important step in saving women’s lives and improving the Ministry’s 
capacity to serve the most vulnerable populations of Nicaragua.286  
 International solidarity played an important role in influencing Nicaraguan 
women and the reproductive medicine they were able to access. Beliefs about sexuality 
and reproduction shifted as Nicaraguan and Salvadoran women interacted with feminist 
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ideologies from all over the world. Women adopted ideas about abortion and sexual 
liberation that they felt matched with their own interpretations of the revolution. They 
actively engaged with opportunities for leadership in health care that were funded by 
international sources. Solidarity in both directions, then, proved vital to the development 
of feminist health practices in both El Salvador and Nicaragua.  
F. Conservative Backlash 
In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, women faced opposition to their revolutionary 
goals. In Nicaragua, as men returned home from the revolution and the FSLN took the 
reins, leaders and husbands attempted to reintroduce traditional expectations of gender 
roles. In El Salvador, women faced backlash from a patriarchal government as well as 
their husbands when they tried to step into positions of leadership. Often, this 
conservative backlash came in response to women’s roles as healthcare workers and in 
reaction to more accessible family planning services. 
Aynn Setright claimed that in Nicaragua, men “were very suspicious of the 
women not just accepting the children that god gave them, but doing any kind of family 
planning”. The conservative backlash came with a “shocking amounts of domestic 
violence”. She notes that women’s new leadership roles “created a lot of tension as the 
men came back” from fighting.287 Women addressed the domestic violence publicly. 
Setright saw a number of attempts to combat the violence including the beating of pots 
and pans outside of a home where a man could be heard abusing his wife.288 Rosario 
Montoya tells of Doña Julia who hung her torn underwear for all the neighborhood to see 
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in order to embarrass her husband. Montoya points out that such an act “would have been 
inconceivable before the revolution.”289 
Gloria Carrión, a Sandinista, discussed the tension as well. Carrión stated that: 
  
Women’s political involvement had its effect on relationships between women 
and men. Women began to develop their own points of view on issues and began 
to express their ideas. In homes where both the husband and wife lived together 
new relationships developed. Women started to make their feelings and opinions 
known. They would disagree with their husbands on issues where they never had 
before. And as women got involved in activities outside the home their time was 
less fully devoted to the home and the division of labour within the family began 
to change. All this demanded a re-evaluation of the family situation. And our 
women’s movement became stronger through this whole process.290  
 
Women faced tension with husbands and increased rates of domestic violence. They 
actively responded to these new challenges by mobilizing community networks. In El 
Salvador, “Women’s organizing set limits to sexism.”291 As AMES worked to address 
marital rape, the organization also tried not to alienate the “many peasant women who 
had lost their partners, sons, and male relatives to state violence.”292  
Navigating changing gender norms proved difficult in both countries, but women 
rallied together to address the backlash that resulted. Women would not go back to the 
lives they led before, particularly those women who had stepped into healthcare 
leadership roles. Setright noted that the women who had come to live in community 
following displacement chose to involve themselves in building their communities, in 
part through creating healthcare systems beneficial to all of the women. When their 
husbands returned from the war, the women wanted to stay and enjoy the benefits of the 
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networks they had built, but the men wanted to move back to their isolated homes.293 
Women’s desire to stay in community fundamentally changed their way of life, as well as 
their children’s lives. The decisions that women made, despite the backlash and tension 
with their husbands and male leadership, contributed to important shifts in gender roles. 
Women who stood up to their husbands in both Nicaragua and El Salvador contributed to 
these feminist revolutions that had profound impacts in both societies. 
G. Conclusion 
 Health care played an important role for women in the revolutions of both 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. In both countries, women pursued the revolutionary goals of 
increased access to health care, particularly reproductive and child health, even as the 
revolutions were forced away from those goals to attend to warfare. As the need for 
healthcare workers increased, women stepped up. They used the platforms they gained as 
volunteers, community health workers, and nurses to navigate the revolution in ways that 
benefitted them. Women did not subjugate their own demands to support the broader 
revolution, but rather they built a feminist understanding that can be understood through 
their roles in health care. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS 
“everything went on the same only different after the revolution: the same only 
different.”294 – Sara Miles 
On January 16, 1992, the Salvadoran government and FMLN signed the 
Chapultepec peace accord, ostensibly ending over a decade of violent warfare in the 
country. Less than two years prior, Violeta Chamorro de Barrios defeated the FSLN in 
Nicaragua’s presidential elections, bringing a decade of Sandinista rule to a close. Under 
these new terms, and with a pivot toward the Middle East, U.S. intervention in the region 
slowed dramatically, and the armed violence that characterized the 1980s dissipated.  
International solidarity workers left the region en masse (though many remained 
in close contact with people and organizations). Those who stayed experienced major 
changes in the relevance of their previous roles. Jill Winegardner lived in Nicaragua 
during the transition years. As an educator, she felt the election of Chamorro through her 
students. “One of the things that happened was the students in my [neuropsychological] 
course started having economic problems, so they weren’t able to participate in the 
training. Some of them had to take other jobs or move to other countries.”295 Aynn 
Setright watched a major change in access take place. The Chamorro government worked 
to privatize pharmaceuticals, so while Nicaraguans continued to have access to doctors, 
as per the constitution, they often lacked the funds to buy the medicines prescribed to 
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them. “You could go see a doctor, but the doctor no longer had a pharmacy to give away 
the medicine.” This, according to Setright, led to “a huge deterioration of the health 
services provided.”296 
As international solidarity shrank, leftist activists continued to fund health 
initiatives in Nicaragua, just not through the government. “Aid that had formerly been 
provided to [MINSA] was rapidly shifted for distribution to nongovernmental 
organizations in what must be the first international campaign to privatize leftist 
assistance for public health.” A call to refuse funding from USAID was published in a 
1990 edition of Links, a magazine produced by NCAHRN.297 Some rightist political and 
religious groups stepped in, “including the Dooley Foundation, Freedom Medicine, and 
the Pan American Development Foundation.”298 
Government aid shifted inversely to solidarity aid. Whereas the United States 
backed the Contras and economically undermined the Sandinistas through sanctions, less 
than one month after Chamorro was elected, President Bush lifted sanctions and 
requested $300 million in aid for Nicaragua.299 The irony, Garfield and Williams point 
out, came when USAID encouragement of “community participation and public health-
oriented health professionals” matched with former Sandinista policies. Moreover, the 
health workers most qualified to carry out USAID work “were FSLN-related groups and 
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individuals.” USAID found itself in a position “to encourage primary care without 
supporting the Sandinistas.”300 
In the immediate aftermath, Nicaragua struggled to maintain “a health system” 
that “limped along bravely.”301 The movement away from socialized health care 
unraveled many of the achievements gained by the FSLN. Cheasty Anderson attributes 
the deterioration to “a loss of popular participation and public involvement in the health 
sector,” and “a failure at the Ministry level to adequately budget and provision the health 
care system.”302 Garfield and Williams, too attribute the lagging health system to loss of 
popular support, arguing that “by 1991 organization and motivation were in short 
supply,” and claiming that the anticipated number of health brigadista volunteers fell far 
short of the necessary target.303 
Throughout the 1990s, the Chamorro government pursued a policy of healthcare 
decentralization defined by four major qualities: “overall health spending reductions, 
spending priorities for secondary care over primary care, privatization, and the promotion 
of user fees.”304 The results of decentralization and decreased social spending included a 
twelve percent drop between 1992 and 1996 in real health spending,305 as much as a fifty 
percent drop in prenatal coverage and vaccination rates in certain provinces,306 and a 
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tripling in incidence of malaria on average between 1995-1997 when compared to the 
1980-1990 average.307  
Decentralization was encouraged by international institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as part of a neoliberal agenda, and 
led to a decline in the health system and an undermining of medical workers. For nearly 
four months in 1998, some 4,000 Nicaraguan doctors went on strike to protest their 
poverty wages.308 The debt accrued by Nicaragua in the 1990s further devastated the 
revolutionary spirit that came to define the decade prior. 
In El Salvador, the FMLN became a political party, and the government moved 
back in to war zones previously evacuated of all government services. These FMLN-
controlled zones, where popular medicine had developed with the help of solidarity 
activists, revolutionary actors, and volunteer community health workers, came back 
under the infrastructure and health sphere of the central government. Mark Smith recalled 
the plight of those who had devoted their lives to providing medical care for their 
communities. “After the war, as the ministry came back in… the promoter’s organized 
and tried to become employees of the ministry so they would be paid for what they were 
doing because up until this point, they had received no compensation, this was all 
volunteer work.” Many wanted to remain village health workers under the ministry, but 
“it didn’t work out.” Smith recalled “maybe two or three who became ministry 
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employees.” He went on to say that “the Ministry wanted to put their own people in.” The 
community health workers were “seen as kind of a threat by the Ministry.”309 
Susan Classen recalled the uncertainty surrounding the return of the Ministry of 
Health to Chalatenango department. “It was a real question for a lot of people. Is it the 
best in the long run to work with the Health Department or is it best to keep the 
alternative health care system?” Classen went on to note that different regions of the 
department agreed to cooperate to varying degrees.310 The popular health system, which 
had functioned for years underfunded, understaffed, and understocked, continued on 
throughout the country even after the cease fire.  
Over a five-year period, between 1992 and 1997, Sandy Smith-Nonini witnessed 
the power struggle between health workers reluctant to cede control to the government 
and the “ministry’s gradual reentry and assertion of control over the ex-war zone’s health 
services.”311 The rural areas of Chalatenango, many of which had been left empty during 
the war, were repopulated starting in the late 1980s. Smith-Nonini notes that in her five 
years there, the “situation of the rural population in government-controlled areas was 
little changed… compared with before the war.”312 The post-peace accord struggle over 
health “reflected a dialectic between the ministry’s commitment to a centralized 
biomedical model dominated by physicians and the popular system’s commitment to a 
strong degree of community control over health and reliance on local lay health 
promoters.”313 
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As in Nicaragua, structural readjustment imposed by the World Bank in 1995 
encouraged restructuring of the El Salvador’s healthcare system.314 Ironically, while 
USAID funded as much as 75% of the Salvadoran Ministry of Health’s pharmaceutical 
purchases in the 1980s in an attempt to bolster the central government, by the early 
1990s, funding was being funneled toward local health promoters.315 Physicians at the 
Ministry resented this fact. By the time USAID funding was phased out in 1994, the 
health promoter program had been thoroughly undermined by physicians who saw it as 
dangerous and threatening.316 
Political and economic changes in the 1990s severely undermined the 
revolutionary momentum of the 1980s. The healthcare policies, the impact of solidarity, 
and the fracturing of gender norms that occurred remain important legacies of a 
revolutionary period in Central American history. Understanding the revolutionary nature 
of popular health care in 1980s Central America helps illuminate how revolutionary 
medicine still can be. Taking up the call for popular medicine of FMLN and FSLN 
revolutionaries remains as vital today as it was then. The privatization of medical care 
and pharmaceuticals across the world threaten the lives of billions of people. The 
revolutionary spirit of Central America in the 1980s has much to teach us about how we 
can combat flawed and dangerous healthcare practices across the globe.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
314 Ibid., 220. 
315 Ibid., 221. 
316 Ibid., 222.		
 	 114 
APPENDIX A. POPULAR HEALTH WORK DAY PROGRAM 
 
Program for a Popular Health Work Day held in Managua, Nicaragua on October 21 and 
22, 1988. In author’s possession, provided by Dr. Arnold Matlin. 
 
  
 	 115 
 	 116 
 	 117 
 
 	 118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	 119 
APPENDIX B. NCAHRN PAMPHLET 
 
NCAHRN pamphlet. This pamphlet exemplifies the campaign efforts undertaken by 
solidarity activists in the 1980s. It includes information on the activities of NCAHRN, 
including the North America-Nicaragua Annual Health Colloquium and Insulin for Life. 
In author’s possession, provided by Dr. Arnold Matlin.  
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